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Summary
Developing countries are increasingly using auctions for the procurement 
of utility-scale renewable electricity, due to the potential for attracting 
private investment. However, auction design and implementation can 
face serious obstacles due to complex context-specific factors. In 
2017, Ethiopia launched its Public–Private Partnership (PPP) policy and 
procurement framework to promote infrastructure development, including 
electricity generation. Since 2018, it has organised renewable energy 
auctions to procure new capacity from independent power producers 
(IPPs). However, the new framework faces numerous challenges. Using 
a literature review and primary data from more than 70 interviews and 
from stakeholder consultations, this study explores the political economy 
challenges and opportunities facing IPP project preparation, decision-
making, coordination and implementation, and risks to investors. To date, 
Ethiopia has held two rounds of tenders to procure 1,000 megawatts (MW) 
of electricity from eight projects; the first tender for two solar photovoltaic 
(PV) projects led to the signing of Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and 
was hailed as one of the cheapest tariff rates in sub-Saharan Africa, at 
US$2.526 cents/kilowatt hour (kWh) over 25 years. However, none of the 
projects have yet become operational. This study also finds fault lines 
impeding the implementation of IPP projects, including the risk of foreign 
currency availability and convertibility of Ethiopian birr to expatriate profits. 
It proposes measures to overcome these obstacles and mitigate risks, to 
put Ethiopia on course to achieve universal access to electricity by 2030.
Keywords
renewable energy procurement; renewable energy transition; 
electricity generation; public–private partnerships; 
independent power producers; policy; Ethiopia.
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Executive summary 
Ethiopia has made major strides in improving its electricity sector in the 
past two decades. However, the sector remains characterised by heavy 
dependence on publicly financed hydropower generation, poor electricity 
access, and unreliable power systems. Over 90 per cent of its current 4,478 
megawatt (MW) capacity comes from hydroelectric power generated by 
the government, and only 44 per cent of the population (estimated at 117 
million) have access to electricity. The National Electrification Programme 
(NEP 2.0) and the Ten Years Perspective Development Plan (2021–2030) 
(National Planning Commission 2020) aim to increase capacity to 
17,056MW and achieve universal access by 2030. Nearly a quarter of new 
generation capacity is set to be procured from non-hydropower renewable 
resources, mainly by private sector independent power producers (IPPs). 
Various reforms have been introduced to help realise these targets. 
Recognising the importance of a robust procurement framework to 
attract private investment into the infrastructure sector, in 2017 the 
Government of Ethiopia introduced the Public–Private Partnership 
(PPP) policy. Subsequently, the Public–Private Partnership Proclamation 
1076/2018 set out the institutional and legal framework for implementing 
the policy. Several non-hydro renewable energy projects were planned, 
and auctions launched from 2018. Yet, the implementation of the new 
procurement framework faces challenges, as well as bringing opportunities 
for private sector participation in order to meet the target of universal 
access. Ethiopia’s challenges are accentuated by the fact that it is new 
to procuring electricity through market-based auction mechanisms 
and thus has institutional and technical capacity limitations.
The UK government-funded study, Renewable Energy Procurement in 
Ethiopia: Overcoming Obstacles in Procurement from Independent 
Power Producers, aimed to explore the emerging challenges and 
opportunities. The study drew on a wide literature review, primary 
data from more than 70 interviews and stakeholder consultations, 
and secondary data exploring the political economy challenges 
facing IPP project preparation, decision-making, coordination and 
implementation, and risks to investors. This Research Report documents 
the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
Following the Ethiopian government’s PPP policy and Proclamation, in 
2018, it set out the roles and responsibilities of institutions implementing 
IPP projects. Accordingly, it created a PPP Board and a PPP Directorate 
General Unit (PPP-DGU), both located within the Ministry of Finance, and 
defined their respective roles and responsibilities; the government also 
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set out the roles and responsibilities of Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP) (the 
power buyer). Shortly after it was set up, the PPP Board approved 19 IPP 
projects. Two rounds of tenders ensued for the procurement of 1,000MW of 
electricity from eight projects. Launched in October 2018, the first tender 
was for two solar photovoltaic (PV) projects, each of 125MW, which led to 
the signing of a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with a Saudi Arabian 
company, ACWA Power, in December 2019. The agreement resulted in one 
of the cheapest tariff rates in sub-Saharan Africa – at US$2.526 cents/
kilowatt hour (kWh) over 25 years. Another three IPP projects predating the 
PPP policy and framework were also approved, and EEP signed PPAs with 
three IPP project developers: one solar PV and two geothermal projects.
While these were significant developments, at the time of writing, 
none of the projects had become operational. This study revealed 
a number of major barriers hindering the development of renewable 
energy in Ethiopia through an auction-based procurement 
framework, namely: ambitious electricity generation targets; 
governance for electricity procurement; and the risk to investors. 
The number and size of IPP projects is too ambitious: Two tenders were 
announced in quick succession for eight projects, but without significant 
preparation and learning from projects that are being implemented. 
Projects also tend to be large scale, which adds risk. Ambitious energy 
plans are inherent in the system and driven by narratives around 
Ethiopia’s rich renewable resources and unmet demand. IPP projects 
were seen as ‘quick-fix’ solutions. We recommend that target-setting 
should be more realistic and based on the understanding of complex 
factors, such as risk to investors in raising project finance. 
IPP governance is rife with institutional tensions due to overlapping roles 
and responsibilities, particularly between the PPP-DGU and EEP. The latter 
perceives that its roles and responsibilities have been ‘appropriated’ by 
the former, even though the PPP-DGU has limited capacity to prepare 
and implement tenders. The tensions appear to have demotivated EEP 
staff, slowing down the tender process. There is no ‘silver bullet’ solution 
to this problem, but the core institutions involved need to draw on their 
competency areas and work together to succeed. The PPP-DGU could 
focus on provision of sovereign guarantees for IPPs, while EEP, as an off-taker, 
could focus on all the technical aspects of electrify procurement via IPPs.
Finally, investors face a number of risks – principally the foreign currency 
availability and convertibility of Ethiopian birr. Availability is a reflection 
of the unhealthy status of Ethiopia’s foreign exchange (forex) reserves. 
While this is not new or unique to Ethiopia, what makes it pronounced 
to investors and their financiers is the unpredictable nature of access 
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to forex to expatriate profit. Moreover, armed conflicts in northern 
Ethiopia, as well as low-level ethnic-based political tensions across 
the country, conflated with global geopolitics and use of ‘soft’ power, 
have been straining investment flows into renewables and other 
sectors. The study proposes a range of measures to mitigate this risk, 
including commitment to a timeline for currency repatriation.
The above challenges are largely part of the learning process during 
the transition from a state-led to a market-led development pathway in 
the energy sector. While there are no immediate solutions to challenges, 
there are areas for improvement, as indicated above. The most urgent 
task for the new tender-based renewable energy IPP projects in Ethiopia 
is to reach the milestone of financial close (securing project funds) 
for at least one awarded IPP project, as a successfully implemented 
project would speak for itself regarding the feasibility and credibility 
of procurement via IPPs, despite the various challenges and concerns. 
Before such a milestone is achieved, it would seem unwise to vigorously 
promote new renewable energy IPPs under current circumstances. 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background to the study 
An approach that involves using auctions for the procurement of utility-
scale renewable electricity has gained prominence in developing countries 
due to its potential to attract significant private investment (Baker, Hook 
and Sovacool 2021a). Under market-based auctions (also referred to 
as competitive bidding programmes or tendering),2 project developers 
submit a bid with a price per unit below a certain cap at which they will 
sell the electricity generated by their project to an off-taker, which could 
be the state-owned utility or a large consumer. The project that meets 
the qualifying criteria at the lowest price wins the bid. Auctions are usually 
held under a series of bidding rounds, which set the volume of generation 
capacity that can be awarded. In some countries, capacity is specified by 
technology type, while in other cases, auctions are technology neutral (ibid.).
Ethiopia launched its Public–Private Partnership (PPP) policy in 2017 to 
promote national infrastructure development, including the generation 
of electricity (Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation 2017). 
Following the publication of Proclamation 1076/2018 (Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 2018) and the formation of the PPP Board in 2018, the 
PPP-Directorate General Unit (PPP-DGU) began organising renewable 
energy auctions to procure new capacity from independent power 
producers (IPPs). Auction design appears relatively simple; however, 
in practice, its implementation can face serious obstacles due to 
complex factors of political economy. These include interactions with 
the broader regulatory system, friction with incumbent actors, and a 
mismatch of expectations between regulators and private investors 
(Baker et al. 2021b). Despite the huge potential of renewable energy 
auctions, there are notable knowledge gaps regarding how these 
obstacles can be overcome and how the risks can be mitigated.
2 In this report we use the terms ‘competitive bidding’, ‘tendering’ and ‘auctions’ synonymously. The 
term ‘tender’ refers to the procurement process and the term ‘auction’ to the procedure of selecting 
competing bids by price. In practice, the two terms are used interchangeably (Gephart, Klessmann and 
Wigand 2017).
15Research Report Volume 2021 Number 87 
Renewable Energy Procurement in Ethiopia: Overcoming Obstacles in 
Procurement from Independent Power Producers
ids.ac.uk
1.2 Objective of the study 
This study was funded by the UK government’s Energy and Economic 
Growth (EEG)3 programme Renewable Energy Procurement in Ethiopia 
(REPE) project, which aims to understand the legal and institutional 
framework needed for renewable energy competitive bidding programmes 
to be effective in Ethiopia. The project was designed to draw lessons from 
Ethiopia’s experience of power generation procurement (pre-dating the 
PPP framework) and from the experiences of other countries (such as 
South Africa and China) with renewable energy auction programmes.4 
The project aimed to answer the following research questions around 
barriers and opportunities for private sector participation: What are the 
barriers and constraints during auction design and implementation of 
renewable energy projects? Are there adequate skills available in Ethiopia 
to design, build and operate energy projects? How are any capacity gaps 
addressed? What are the key agendas of private sector actors involved 
in IPPs in Ethiopia, and what types and levels of risk do investors face? 
1.3 Research methods and tools
1.3.1 Data collection methods and tools
The study is anchored in the political economy analysis of the Ethiopian 
renewables sector, which situates energy within the prevailing political and 
economic structures, institutions and processes, as well as interactions 
between actors to address constraints to policy change to improve 
outcomes (DFID 2009; Ayele, Zegeye and Nisbett 2020; McCulloch, Sindou 
and Ward 2017). We explore PPP/IPP governance structures, their evolution, 
and who decides and influences their decision-making and outcomes. While 
appreciating the non-linear nature of the policy process (agenda-setting, 
policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation) (Jann 
and Wegrich 2007), we use a political economy approach to understand 
the complex realities at each stage. Thus, in the study, we involved core 
stakeholders from the renewable energy sector, both state and non-state 
actors. We used diverse data collection methods and tools, as follows. 
1. Deskwork: We reviewed academic articles and grey literature on the 
Ethiopian electricity/political economy of renewable energy, its politics, 
policy and practice. The study aimed to provide a historical review 
and analysis of IPP activities focusing on Ethiopia’s recent projects, 
3 See Energy and Economic Growth (accessed 1 November 2021).
4 This lesson is documented in a paper by Baker, Shen and Ayele (2021b).
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and to conduct a comprehensive review of Ethiopian government 
policies, legal frameworks and programme documents on IPPs. 
2. Stakeholder and key informant interviews: Deskwork was complemented 
by in-depth interviews with individuals from key stakeholder institutions, 
including government departments and donors involved in and/or 
knowledgeable about renewable energy politics, finance, policy and 
practice. We also interviewed chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
managers of project companies, consultants and transaction 
advisors. In total, primary data was generated from more than 40 
interviews and 27 consultation workshop participants (see Table 1.1)
3. In-depth stakeholder consultation workshop:5 As noted, 27 key 
stakeholders from government and non-governmental organisations 
participated in a workshop held in August 2019 in Addis Ababa. The 
aim was to identify major obstacles to and opportunities for renewable 
energy auction programme design and implementation in Ethiopia.
Phase 1 interviews with government and donor representatives were 
conducted in person between November and December 2019. However, 
in early 2020, the project and the fieldwork were interrupted, mainly by the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Thus phase 2 interviews with project company 
managers, financiers and consultants were conducted online between 
June and July 2021. 
5 Participants were from the public sector (Ministry of Finance and MoWIE policymakers, energy 
regulators, generators and transmitters and distributers) and bilateral and multilateral donors involved 
in the sector (28 August 2019, Elilly International Hotel, Addis Ababa).
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Government agencies: Ministry 
of Finance/PPP-DGU 
MoWIE 





Including senior staff at the Ministry of Finance 
and PPP-DGU heads of departments at MoWIE, 




7 Including representatives from the World Bank, 
the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Power 
Africa in Ethiopia
Company CEOs, consultants 
and transaction advisors
7 Including representatives from Tulu Moye 
Geothermal, ACWA Power and Metehara 
projects, and key informants
Total number of interviews 43
Consultation workshop 
participants (total)
27 Government and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), various donor 
representatives
Source: Authors’ own.
1.3.2 Research instruments and analytical tools
Tailored to the specific roles of interviewees, data collection instruments 
were used to collect data from the major renewables agencies. Tools 
included questions about the governance of IPP/PPP and the private 
sector’s responses to the newly introduced PPP policy – that is, how policy 
and its implementation in practice shape their routine and strategic 
operations when investing in renewable energy projects in Ethiopia. Our 
questions focused not only on major challenges (and opportunities) but 
also on how such obstacles and risks might be addressed or mitigated. 
Interviews were transcribed and early findings were presented to core 
stakeholders in two webinars,6 and validated. Interview transcripts and 
feedback from the stakeholder workshop were used to identify and 
code recurring themes, followed by analysis and synthesis. The primary 
data was triangulated with secondary sources in order to draw final 
conclusions. The combination of interviews and document analysis 
helped to reveal the power dynamics and dominant players around 
renewable energy IPP governance, and the perceived (and real) risks of 
implementing IPP projects, as well as the opportunities they present. 
6 The first webinar was held on 24 February 2021 and the second on 16 November 2021.
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1.4 Structure of the report
Focusing on IPP experiences in sub-Saharan Africa, section 2 presents a 
review and synthesis of the literature on renewable energy procurement 
through IPPs. Section 3 reviews the evolution and current status of electricity 
sector development in Ethiopia, covering the most recent drivers of the 
renewables sector and the context for procurement through IPPs. Section 
4 presents our findings, detailing the opportunities and challenges of 
procuring electricity through IPPs from the perspective of the implementing 
institutions and their capabilities. Section 5 presents findings on the 
challenges and opportunities from the perspective of private sector 
actors. Section 6 discusses possible approaches to reducing or removing 
the barriers to successful procurement of renewable energy in Ethiopia, 
while section 7 presents our conclusions and recommendations. 
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2. Renewable energy procurement 
from IPPs in the global context 
2.1 Renewable energy procurement 
from IPPs in a historical context 
To understand the emergence of market-based frameworks for the 
procurement of utility-scale renewable energy from IPPs in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as indeed elsewhere, we must first situate electricity governance 
within its historical context, including the ideological tensions that have long 
existed between state ownership and control of the electricity sector on 
the one hand, and its liberalisation on the other (Baker et al. 2021a). In the 
first half of the twentieth century, the electricity sector, in countries where it 
was well-established, was operated and managed by vertically integrated 
state-owned utilities. Such an arrangement followed the rationale of the 
time, which saw the state as the ‘custodian of the public interest’. However, 
under global neoliberal trends of the 1980s and 1990s, this rationale started 
to shift in favour of the liberalisation of the electricity sector alongside other 
networked industries such as rail and water (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). 
This shift was led by England and Wales, soon followed by other (mostly 
developed) countries, including Norway, Chile, Australia and New Zealand 
(Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001), resulting in the so-called ‘standard model’ 
of electricity sector reform, which quickly became a global template. 
The rationale behind the standard model was that public ownership 
resulted in poor technical performance and was unable to meet the 
high levels of investment required by the electricity sector, including its 
expansion to previously unserved areas. Proponents of the standard 
model argued that a state-owned monopoly utility should be unbundled 
into private generation, transmission and distribution companies, with 
transmission carried out by a government or private body companies on 
the basis of principles of efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Baker et al. 
2021a). At its most complete, progress within this ‘standard model’ means 
moving from a situation where all core functions of electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution are vertically integrated, to one where 
significant competition is introduced in generation, transmission and 
subsequently distribution in wholesale and retail markets (Gratwick and 
Eberhard 2008). The model relied on the creation of a strong independent 
national regulator to ‘regulate the monopoly prone parts’ of the industry 
(Victor and Heller 2007: 7). In many developing countries, the model was 
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promoted by multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank and 
implemented by technical consultants as part of the loan conditionalities 
of structural adjustment programmes (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008).
However, the logic behind the standard model and electricity sector 
liberalisation more generally failed to predict that its implementation 
in practice would be much more complex and result in various forms of 
failure, incomplete implementation, and stranded assets, particularly in 
developing countries (Eberhard and Godinho 2017). There are various 
reasons for this. First, the high capital costs and long-term investment 
horizons (of approximately 30 years) of many electricity generation projects 
made it difficult to attract the anticipated levels of private investment, 
particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Second, the profit-
driven nature of investment prioritised conventional technologies over 
low-carbon ones such as wind and solar, which during the 1980s and 
1990s were considered relatively high risk by investors. The negotiation 
of the contractual and regulatory terms for private power generation 
was also challenging and complex, and saw national energy regulators 
undermined by vested interests, struggling to fulfil their mandate in a 
market where information is incomplete (Victor and Heller 2007). A further 
area of tension was the importance assigned to the host government 
and/or other national stakeholders to provide a sovereign-backed 
guarantee as a bottom line of risk mitigation for investors. Finally, the 
emphasis on market competition failed to protect the provision of basic 
energy services to poor people, and contributed to disastrous social and 
economic consequences in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Hall 
2010). Consequently, there are few countries in which the standard model 
has been fully implemented (Sen 2014; Baker, Shen and Ayele 2021b).
In recent years, a growing consensus has developed within mainstream 
thinking, including within the World Bank, that a more flexible and 
context-specific approach is needed to develop a strong and capable 
power sector (Foster and Rana 2020). This is particularly important in 
the context of rapid technological changes in renewable electricity 
generation at both the utility and distributed scale, leading to increased 
cost-competitiveness throughout the renewable energy supply chain 
(Baker et al. 2021a). Renewable energy, particularly solar photovoltaic (PV) 
and onshore and offshore wind, now dominates new investment in the 
global power sector. More diverse models of electricity governance have 
also emerged, including various forms of hybrid or dual markets in which 
vertically integrated, state-owned utilities remain as the dominant player 
and buyer of electricity, but IPPs contribute a certain amount of generation 
capacity (Eberhard et al. 2016). As the next subsection illustrates, South 
Africa is a prime example of this: since 2011, utility-scale renewable energy 
21Research Report Volume 2021 Number 87 
Renewable Energy Procurement in Ethiopia: Overcoming Obstacles in 
Procurement from Independent Power Producers
ids.ac.uk
has been procured from IPPs, but its state-owned utility Eskom remains as 
the single buyer and owner of the transmission grid, and generates the bulk 
of the country’s electricity generation. As section 3 of this report illustrates, 
in Ethiopia, renewable energy IPPs have increasingly been facilitated by 
tenders or competitive bidding programmes, which, in the early 2000s, 
replaced feed-in tariffs as the most popular mechanism of procurement.7 
According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), by 
the end of 2018, 106 countries had held at least one auction for the 
procurement of renewable electricity (IRENA 2018: 88). And with the above 
context in mind, the introduction of renewable energy procurement 
programmes in many countries, including in sub-Saharan Africa, has 
been located within highly diverse national contexts at various stages 
of liberalisation, institutional efficiency and regulatory capacity. 
2.2 Energy generation through IPPs in South Africa 
The first country in sub-Saharan Africa to implement a competitive 
bidding programme for utility-scale renewable energy was South Africa, 
under its Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement 
Programme (REIPPPP), launched in 2011 into an otherwise state-owned, 
coal-fired monopoly electricity sector (Baker et al. 2014). REIPPPP remains 
the largest procurement programme for renewable energy to date in 
sub-Saharan Africa. As discussed below, despite various challenges and 
delays to the programme, South Africa has now seen the procurement 
of approximately 6.4 gigawatt (GW) of renewable energy, the majority 
from solar PV and onshore wind, from 112 IPPs under four bidding rounds8 
(IRENA 2018). The timeline between bid submission date and preferred 
bidder announcement ranged between one and ten months. Likewise, 
the timeline between preferred bidder announcement and financial 
close9 was less than 18 months, while the timeline between financial 
close and start of commercial operation ranged between three and five 
years. The negotiation and implementation of the REIPPPP, supported 
by technical assistance from various bilateral donors (including GIZ, the 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Development 
Bank of South Africa) took place in a political and economic climate that 
7 Broadly speaking, under a feed-in tariff, the electricity regulator or government sets a fixed tariff 
above the market rate with a pre-determined return on investment that will be paid to qualifying IPPs 
or individual generators for each kWh of electricity they sell to the grid over the lifetime of a project. In 
comparison, auctions follow a competitive market-based framework under which IPPs submit a bid 
with a price per unit below a set cap at which they will sell electricity to the grid. The project that meets 
the qualifying criteria at the lowest price wins the bid (Baker et al. 2021a).
8 A fifth bidding round was recently launched in March 2021 (IPP Office 2021).
9 Financial close is defined as ‘The stage when the Concessionaire ties up with the banks/financial 
institutions for the funds required for the project, and conditions precedent to initial drawing of the 
debt have been fulfilled’ (Ministry of Finance/PPP-DGU 2019).
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has long witnessed strong ideological opposition to private ownership 
and the introduction of foreign companies in a sector that has resisted 
many features of the standard model of power sector reform.
The challenges and delays to South Africa’s REIPPPP have been at once 
political, economic and technical. First, there has been strong ideological 
resistance by Eskom and related political factions to the programme, 
and to renewable energy and power sector liberalisation more widely. 
Eskom refused to sign outstanding Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 
from Round 4 of the programme, stating that it would make a loss from 
having to purchase energy from IPPs and that additional capacity 
from renewable energy was also unnecessary. Indeed, it took until April 
2018, after the inauguration of new President Cyril Ramaphosa, for the 
PPAs to be finally signed. The future of REIPPPP hung in the balance 
for some years and Round 5 was only launched in March 2021.
The technical challenges relate largely to the integration of renewable 
electricity into Eskom’s transmission grid, which requires further 
investment and upgrade in order to accommodate an increase in 
variable and intermittent generation sources from renewable energy. 
Moreover, there is now very limited capacity for project connection in 
areas with good wind and solar resources such as the Northern Cape 
province, where the majority of solar PV and concentrated solar power 
projects are located. South Africa’s REIPPPP is seen as a trailblazer for 
the subsequent launch of auctions for the procurement of utility-scale 
renewable energy elsewhere on the continent (IRENA 2018). 
2.3 Energy generation through 
IPPs in sub-Saharan Africa 
Most recently, and as the focus of this report, Ethiopia introduced its PPP 
framework for the procurement of utility-scale renewable electricity in 2017. 
Other countries in the region have implemented auctions, including Ghana, 
Mauritius, Malawi, and Uganda (ibid.). Uganda was the first country in Africa 
to unbundle its electricity generation and distribution sectors into separate 
utilities, to offer private concessions and open the sector to IPPs – a process 
it started in the late 1990s. After South Africa, Uganda has the largest number 
of IPPs in the region, making a total of 158MW of capacity from small projects, 
including hydropower, biomass and solar PV. In 2013, Uganda launched 
the solar PV auction component of its Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariff 
(GETFiT) programme, a complex process of negotiation and experimentation 
that received significant technical assistance from Deutsche Bank and the 
German development bank KfW. However, because this programme is for 
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small-scale projects and for far less overall capacity than that of South 
Africa, its design was somewhat different to that of REIPPPP, and it has been 
less competitive (Bhamidipati, Haselip and Hansen 2019; IRENA 2018). 
Sub-Saharan Africa has also seen a series of auctions dedicated and 
implemented exclusively for solar PV under the World Bank International 
Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Scaling Solar programme, in Ethiopia, Zambia 
and Senegal. Under the programme, the IFC assists with implementation 
of competitive bidding programmes for the procurement of grid-tied 
solar PV in smaller power markets where governments may not be 
able to dedicate extensive resources to setting up renewable energy 
procurement programmes (IRENA 2018: 42). This assistance includes helping 
large developers deal with identified investment risks (such as off-taker 
credit quality, political risks, and the need for a bankable PPA) (ibid.), 
and the provision of advisory services and standardised contracts.
Zambia was the first country in which the Scaling Solar programme was 
implemented, with its Industrial Development Corporation acting outside of 
official ministerial department channels as the procurement unit. Launched 
in October 2015, the programme marked the first renewable energy 
procurement programme of significant scale outside of South Africa, and 
focused on bringing two solar PV projects greater than 50MW on to the grid 
within two years. These projects began operations in early 2019. Zambia’s 
Scaling Solar programme followed a number of the same steps as the 
REIPPPP, as well as the competitive tender component of GETFiT, and has 
been lauded for its low prices (IRENA 2018). However, unlike in South Africa 
and Uganda, which required that winning projects adhere to socioeconomic 
criteria, project selection in Zambia was based purely on price; moreover, 
the government selected the project sites (Kruger, Stritzke and Trotter 2019).
The implementation of Ethiopia’s Scaling Solar programme and other IPPs 
are discussed in subsequent sections.
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3. The political economy 
and renewable energy 
sector of Ethiopia
3.1 Electricity political economy context 
With 117 million people (2021 estimate), Ethiopia is the second most 
populous country in Africa after Nigeria. Its government system is a federal 
parliamentary republic, with 11 self-governing regions10 and two city 
administrations. Between 1991 and the end of 2019, the country was ruled by 
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Since taking 
power in 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has embarked on radical political 
and economic reforms, including dissolving the EPRDF and forming a new 
Prosperity Party in November 2019. Agriculture continues to play a dominant 
role in the economy and contributes 35 per cent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). About 80 per cent of Ethiopians live in rural areas (Ayele 2021).
Ethiopia is undergoing rapid socioeconomic transformation. For most of 
the past 15 years, its economy has seen double-digit growth, reaching 
a respectable rate of 7.9 per cent in 2019 (World Bank 2019b; MoWIE 2019; 
Ayele 2021). Reforms have been driven by public investment in key sectors, 
including energy, where the focus has been on hydropower. Ethiopia has 
abundant and diverse renewable energy resources in hydropower, sunshine, 
geothermal and wind energy (MoWIE 2019), but it has not sufficiently 
exploited its resource advantage. Hydropower is the most exploited source 
but remains below 10 per cent of its potential. Exploitation of the huge 
potential of solar, geothermal and wind sources is negligible. Consequently, 
Ethiopia’s energy supply is highly dependent on biomass resources, namely 
firewood and agricultural waste (which accounted for 87 per cent of total 
national energy consumption in 2017), while modern fuels contributed 
about 13 per cent of total energy consumption, of which hydrocarbon 
products constitute 10.4 per cent and electricity 2.6 per cent (MoWIE 2018). 
Despite being endowed with abundant renewable resources, only 
44 per cent of Ethiopia’s population have access to electricity, and 
with per capita electricity consumption of 100kWh per year, Ethiopia is 
the second largest electricity access-deficit country in sub-Saharan 
Africa (MoWIE 2019). Consequently, use of electricity for social and 
10 Following a referendum by residents in five zones and one special district on 30 September 2021, 
Ethiopia’s 11th region, South West Ethiopia, has been created (see Fana Broadcasting Corporate 
2021b).
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economic developments is very low – for example, only 24 per cent 
of primary schools and 30 per cent of health centres have access to 
electricity (World Bank 2019a). Increasing per capita energy consumption 
thus requires accelerated investment in energy infrastructure in the 
medium term (World Bank 2019; MoWIE 2019; Gordon 2018).
However, electricity generation capacity showed a huge jump over the 
past three decades, from 380MW in 1991 to 4,300MW in 2017 and 4,478MW 
in 2020 (National Planning Commission (NPC) 2020; Tesfamichael et al. 
2021). With the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and other major 
projects in the pipeline, Ethiopia aims to reach 100 per cent electricity 
access by 2030, achieving Goal 7 of the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). To meet its ambitious goals, over the past seven years, 
Ethiopia has taken major steps to procure electricity from solar, wind and 
geothermal sources from IPPs, but not one project has yet been completed. 
Below, we review policy and institutional reforms and the resource base to 
provide the context for electricity procurement through IPPs in Ethiopia.
3.2 Reforms in the Ethiopian electricity sector
Electric lights were believed to have been switched on at Emperor Menelik 
II’s palace in the late 1890s (Gnogno 2019), but until 1956–57 Ethiopia had no 
formal national policy or agency to guide the generation and distribution 
of electricity. Thus, 1956–57 can be seen as the baseline in terms of policies, 
institutions and technical capacity for the development of electricity 
in the country. In 1956, an independent vertically integrated entity, the 
Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (EELPA), was established 
under the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Teferra 2002). EELPA was tasked 
with generating, transmitting and providing access to electricity, with 
mandates to develop technical and human capacity. Then, with the start 
of three successive five-year development plans in 1957, energy became a 
key development input, with each plan setting out a vision and targets for 
electricity generation, transmission and use, and technical development. 
To meet national targets as well as growing demand, power plants were 
built with relatively larger installed capacities. One of these was the Koka 
hydroelectric power plant, completed in 1960, which had an installed 
capacity of 43MW. In subsequent decades, more large hydropower 
plants followed, including the 153MW Melka Wakena plant built during 
the socialist-cum-military government (the Derg) regime (Carr 2017). 
Following the electricity sector liberalisation trends in sub-Saharan 
Africa (see section 2), the period from 1997 to 2013 saw partial reforms 
to the state monopoly, EELPA. First, in 1997, EELPA was restructured into 
two entities: the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo), whose 
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remit was to generate, transmit, distribute and sell electricity; and the 
Ethiopian Energy Authority (EEA), whose remit was to regulate the sector 
(Teferra 2002). The reforms made EEPCo ‘independent’ of its line ministry 
in order to reduce bureaucratic delays in decision-making and – at 
least in theory – to allow it to determine tariff rates based on commercial 
principles. Since 2010, the electricity sector has been driven by two 
Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I: 2010/11–2014/15; and GTP II: 
2015/16–2019/20) (NPC 2016). To meet its national and global commitments 
to the Millennium Development Goals (and subsequently the SDGs), Ethiopia 
continued to reform its energy sector (World Bank 2019b; MoWIE 2019). 
Most importantly, in 2013, a radical restructuring of EEPCo was undertaken 
in order to drive renewable procurement from private suppliers. Several 
factors led to these changes. First, EEPCo had been dependent on 
public finances, which was causing large budget deficits for the treasury. 
Its investment capacity was low, and it was not able to switch to 
non-hydropower renewable sources (World Bank 2019b). Its tariff rates 
(which were as low as US$0.03/kWh in 2006) also failed to reflect production 
costs and demand (ibid.). Second, there was insufficient investment to meet 
the ambitious target set by the government in its second GTP, aiming to 
achieve 17,208MW by 2020, up from 4,300MW in 2016/17 (NPC 2016; World 
Bank 2019b). Third, droughts and climate change have been threatening 
sustainable power generation from hydropower sources. Finally, there has 
also been a pressing need to transition towards a cleaner energy system, as 
more than 80 per cent of the population currently depend on unsustainable 
traditional biomass energy sources (World Bank 2019b; Gordon 2018). 
Hence the reforms undertaken in 2013 split EEPCo into Ethiopian Electric 
Power (EEP) and Ethiopian Electric Utility (EEU).11 EEP was mandated 
to generate power and build transmission lines, while EEU distributes, 
sells and manages national electricity operations. Other changes in 
the policy framework include the following (see also Gordon 2018).
– Energy Proclamation No. 810/2013 was issued to encourage 
independent power procurement and off-grid renewable systems, 
and to enhance efficient on-grid management. These policy 
developments brought the likes of Reykjavik Geothermal to Ethiopia 
to start one of the pioneer IPPs – the Corbetti Geothermal project. 
– Geothermal Resources Development Proclamation No. 981/2016 set out a 
framework for managing geothermal resources, previously covered by the 
Mining Law.
11 The EEA, however, continued to play the autonomous regulatory role of energy efficiency, 
conservation, safety and quality; as well as issuing licenses, determining tariffs and setting 
performance standards.
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– The 2017 Public–Private Partnership (PPP) policy and subsequent 
Proclamation No. 1076/2018 both aimed to facilitate private investment in 
major infrastructure projects, including activities in the electricity sector.
– In 2018, within the Ministry of Finance, a dedicated PPP Directorate 
General Unit (PPP-DGU) was established to support the design and 
implementation of IPPs. 
Moreover, over the past ten years in particular, policy narratives that drive 
the sector have also become increasingly important in setting electricity 
generation and access targets and, at the same time, helping Ethiopia 
attain its goal of lower middle-income status by 2025 (MoWIE 2019). 
Narratives about addressing energy poverty or characterising Ethiopia as 
a ‘tower of energy’, and energy mixing, came to prominence, and Ethiopia 
continues to plan and implement a series of projects, including its ambitious 
National Electrification Programme 2.0, Lighting to All. The programme, 
which comprises on-grid generation, grid extension and densification, and 
off-grid electrification, provides a roadmap for achieving and financing 
the universal electrification target (MoWIE 2019). Ethiopia aims to increase 
capacity generated to 17,056MW by 2030 (NPC 2020; MoWIE 2019).
3.3 Governance structure of Ethiopian 
electricity sector 
The Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy provides high-level direction 
and policy on electricity and oversees its governance. It coordinates a 
complex and diverse range of actors within the government (including 
regional bureaus of energy) and non-state actors, cooperatives, 
the private sector and donors. It monitors sector performance and 
is accountable for progress and performance (MoWIE 2019).
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Figure 3.1 Electricity governance structure
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on MoWIE (2019)
The ministry supervises the three main electricity agencies (see Figure 3.1):12 
– The EEP operates and maintains 18 power plants (14 hydropower, 
3 wind power and 1 geothermal). It also operates and maintains 
all high-voltage transmission lines across the country. 13 
– The EEU owns, operates and manages the electricity distribution 
networks across Ethiopia. It is responsible for maintaining, upgrading 
and modernising distribution networks to ensure adequate capacity 
to meet the needs of existing and prospective customers. It is also 
responsible for meeting the target of enhancing coverage from 
around 44 per cent to 100 per cent by 2030, in addition to operating 
and managing sub-transmission (45 kilovolts (kV) and 66kV) and 
sub-stations14 (MoWIE 2019). Since 2017, Ethiopia has been exporting 
electricity (albeit at low levels), with 100MW each to Sudan and 
Djibouti, earning around US$80m per year (MoWIE 2019: 6). Kenya 
is also projected to import 400MW from Ethiopia in 2020 (ibid.). 
12 While Figure 3.1 does not capture all actors involved in electricity governance, it important to note 
that, besides MoWIE and its subsidiaries, there are regional bureaus of energy and several line 
ministries involved in the governance system, such as the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Cooperation.
13 See Power Generation, Ethiopian Electric Power website.
14 See Ethiopian Electric Utility website.
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– The Ethiopian Energy Authority (EEA) is a regulatory agency for 
the electricity sector, mandated to issue licences for generation, 
transmission, distribution and sales, as well as the import and export 
of electricity. It provides a licence for IPPs and monitors compliance.15 
As we will discuss in subsequent sections, a major departure from the 
electricity governance structure described above is the governance for 
renewables procured through IPPs. As noted already, precipitated by huge 
investment demand for the generation of renewable energy, particularly from 
solar, geothermal and wind sources, over the past four years the Ethiopian 
government has put in place a PPP mechanism to promote and facilitate 
the implementation of privately financed infrastructure projects, including 
procuring renewable energy from independent power producers. As well 
as the Ministry of Water, Irrigation, and Energy, the EEP, the EEA, and the 
EEU, the Ministry of Finance has become a key player in the procurement of 
renewable electricity from IPPs (see section 4). The Ministry was given the 
lead role to design PPP programmes and to create a favourable framework 
for privately financed projects to support Ethiopian economic growth, as 
well as maintaining macroeconomic stability by reducing growth in public 
debt, and to ensure transparency, fairness, value for money, efficiency and 
long-term sustainability (Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation 
2017). Multilateral and bilateral donor programmes also play a significant 
role in the procurement of electricity from hydro and non-hydro renewable 
sources. Notably, this includes the IFC’s Scaling Solar programme (see section 
2.3),16 which involved assigning transaction advisors to provide support to 
project preparation in areas such as: technical and economic analysis, and 
site identification; bid preparation and tender processes, including request 
for qualification, request for proposal, proposal review and award; and 
finalising financial and final project approval, loan agreement, insurance, etc. 
Finally, prospective investors in the Ethiopian renewables sector need 
to interact and navigate with many other agencies for services such 
as business registration and paying taxes (or claiming exemptions). 
15 Ibid. 
16 See Scaling Solar, Ethiopia.
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4. Findings and analysis of renewable 
energy IPP procurement in Ethiopia 
The next subsections undertake a deeper analysis of the qualitative data 
that emerged from respondents. The specific aim is to understand the 
application of the renewable energy IPP procurement framework, the 
governance of IPPs, auction design and implementation, and the challenges 
thereof. Hence, the next subsection unpacks the PPP framework, the roles 
and functions of key stakeholders, and the responses of policymakers 
and donors on opportunities and fault lines of IPP governance. 
4.1 The PPP/IPP framework 
As noted earlier, in 2017 the Government of Ethiopia launched the PPP17 policy. 
As well as ensuring transparency, fairness, value for money, efficiency and 
long-term sustainability, the policy also aimed to reduce Ethiopia’s mounting 
public debt (Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation 2017). Underlying 
the policy framework are the legal and institutional elements that facilitate 
projects (Figure 4.1). Proclamation No. 1076/2018 provided the scope for 
identification and preparation of projects to be financed under PPPs, and 
defined the stakeholders and institutions established and/or designated to 
implement the policy (Ministry of Finance and PPP-DGU 2019), as follows. 
PPP Board: On the institutional side of the framework, the PPP Board 
was designated to serve as the apex body to approve PPP projects. 
It comprises a panel of senior ministers and officials, including seven 
from the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Ethiopia, MoWIE, the 
Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Public Enterprises, the National 
Planning Commission, the Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Affairs, two 
private sector appointed representatives, plus the PPP Directorate-
General. The Board is responsible for all PPP projects, covering the 
approval of project preparation (such as feasibility studies), financial 
viability, procurement processes, project agreements, approving tender 
or negotiation of results, selecting private sector actors to participate, 
17 According to Proclamation No. 1076/2018 (Federal Negarit Gazette of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 2018), PPP applies to the broad infrastructure sector and it means a ‘long-term 
agreement’ between a public sector agency (also known as (aka) a contracting authority) and a 
private entity (aka a third party) where the private sector provides or contributes to the provision of a 
public service activity. The private sector receives a revenue stream for providing such service from 
end-user charges, government budget, or a combination of the two (Proclamation 1076/2018, Article 
2). For electricity generation, the private sector receives revenue streams from the public sector 
buyer/off-taker (that is, the EEP).
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and coordinating additional government support, including facilitating 
access to project sites. The Board is chaired by the Minister of Finance. 
Figure 4.1 PPP framework and project phases
 
Source: Authors’ own, based on Beyene (2019) and Ministry of Finance and PPP-DGU (2019).
PPP Directorate General Unit (PPP-DGU): Based in, staffed and funded 
by the Ministry of Finance, the PPP-DGU serves as secretariat to the 
PPP Board, providing technical assistance and support on all matters 
relating to PPP projects. It is responsible for selecting and procuring 
projects, through transparent and competitive auction-based bidding 
procedures. It implements procedures related to project preparation, 
procurement, bid documents and project agreements. It also monitors 
and evaluates progress of PPP project implementation. Moreover, the PPP 
policy (Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation 2017: 13) and the 
PPP Proclamation (Article 12) stipulate transfer of some conventional roles 
and responsibilities held by participating public organisations such as the 
EEP to the PPP-DGU. (As we explain below, the application of this policy 
has been a major source of friction between the PPP-DGU and EEP.) 
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administers.18 To fulfil its mandate, by law, EEP is required to form a project 
management team (or teams). 
Project management teams: Within the contracting authority, project 
management teams play an important role in PPP projects. They undertake 
tasks mandated to EEP. 
PPP project development phases (Figure 4.1 – bottom section): Prior to 
an in-depth feasibility study, a project identified for a PPP should first be 
approved by the Ministry of Finance. If approved, EEP undertakes a feasibility 
study, considering criteria such as technical and legal issues, and value for 
money, and a proposal will be submitted to the PPP-DGU for consideration 
by the Board. A project that receives the Board’s approval passes to 
the open bidding/tendering process19 – that is, tender documents and 
contracts will be developed. The bidding process itself goes through two 
steps. The first is the request for qualification (RfQ), where calls will be made 
through widely circulated publications (newspapers, websites of EEP, IFC, 
etc.) encouraging potential suppliers to come forward to express interest. 
From the PPP-DGU’s perspective, the aim is to identify bidders with a track 
record of successful projects. The second step is the request for proposals 
(RfP), when bidders that meet the technical, financial and other criteria 
through the RfQ process will be requested to submit proposals. (As we 
explain below, most of the challenges in procuring electricity from IPPs are 
experienced during the processes of preparing bid documents, selecting 
qualified bidders, and subsequently evaluating and awarding bids.) 
Project Company: Any bid-winning company is required by Ethiopian law 
to set up a subsidiary company to implement the project for the duration of 
the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) period. EEP and PPP-DGU undertake 
contract management and performance reporting (Phase 5, Figure 4.1). 
Our research participants (interviewees and consultation workshop 
participants) hailed the PPP framework as ‘timely’ and a ‘significant 
step’ to engage the private sector in electricity generation from 
renewables. Interaction with research participants generated robust 
data on the opportunities and challenges associated with procuring 
renewable energy from private suppliers, as summarised below.
– Opportunities include: growing demand for electricity, fuelled 
by Ethiopia’s fast-growing economy and population; low 
18 According to Article 15.1, the contracting authority or PPP-DGU also identifies projects.
19 There are, however, circumstances where procurement could be through ‘Direct Negotiations’ 
(Proclamation 1076/2018: Article 39). Approved by the Board, the PPP-DGU may engage with private 
suppliers where there is an urgent need for the provision of the said service, or where the project is of a 
short-term nature and its anticipated investment does not exceed the amount to be specified by the 
directive or where the investment relates to national defence, national security, etc.
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level of use and coverage rate of electricity; export potential; 
technological innovations and falling cost, etc. 
– Risks include: forex availability and convertibility; creditworthiness 
of the off-taker; access to and security of project site, etc. 
– Merits and demerits of IPPs in solar, wind and geothermal sectors: 
reliability of supply; investment needs; potential tariff rates; duration 
of contracts, etc. 
– IPP governance issues: overlapping roles and responsibilities, 
notably between PPP-DGU and EEP; limited consultation over 
allocation of roles and responsibilities; capacity gaps (notably in 
law, finances and environmental and social evaluation projects). 
Workshop participants and interviewees perceived that in 
terms of policy, there are either no gaps (or ‘little’ gaps), and 
that the challenges are mostly with implementation.
4.2 Renewables IPP project auctions 
and approval processes 
Since the PPP framework came into effect in 2018, major progress 
has been made. The Board has approved 23 projects, 19 of which 
are in the energy sector – 8 solar PVs, 5 wind and 6 hydro projects. 
Moreover, eight utility-scale solar PV projects have passed the 
feasibility study stage and received initial approval by the Board.
Two rounds of open and competitive tenders have also been launched 
to procure 1,000MW electricity from eight projects. The first tender 
process was launched in October 2018 for two solar PV projects, each 
for 125MW, in the regions of Afar and Somali. The bidding process 
involved around 100 private companies who expressed interest, of which 
28 submitted bids under the RfQ. Of those, 12 investors pre-qualified 
to submit a proposal. The subsequent bidding process (RfP) led to 
the signing of a PPA with the Saudi Arabian company ACWA Power 
in December 2019. In May 2019, EEP also announced its Scaling Solar 
Round 2 for 750MW from six solar projects20 (see Baker et al. 2021b).
In addition, three PPAs were signed with private suppliers who entered 
the Ethiopian energy market preceding the PPP framework. Since 2013, 
EEP has been undertaking PPP projects, on a negotiation basis, three of 
which led to the signing of PPAs: 100MW of solar PV generation project 
20 Weranso, Welenchiti, Humera and Mekele, as well as the newly added sites in Metema/Bahir Dar 
and Hurso.
34Research Report Volume 2021 Number 87 
Renewable Energy Procurement in Ethiopia: Overcoming Obstacles in 
Procurement from Independent Power Producers
ids.ac.uk
in Metehara; and two geothermal projects – Corbetti (up to 520MW of 
generating capacity) and Tulu Moye (another 520MW) (MoWIE 2019). 
4.3 Ongoing renewables IPP projects 
As already noted, to date PPAs have been signed with five non-hydro 
renewable energy IPPs with total capacity of 650MW (see Table 4.1 and 
Figure 4.2), but none of them have become operational. Details are as follows. 
The Gad and Dicheto solar PV projects (see above) have the greatest 
potential for solar energy production in the country. ACWA has 
proposed the most attractive selling rate at US$0.02526 per kW/h, 
one of the lowest tariffs on the continent. ACWA Power won a 25-year 
contract, with total investment in both projects at US$180m.
Metehara project: This project was developed as the first utility-scale 
solar PV plant, with 100MW installed capacity in Oromia region (see 
Table 4.1). The tendering process was launched by EEP in May 2016, and 
among five shortlisted consortiums, the Italian energy company Enel’s 
renewable energy subsidiary Enel Green Power (EGP) was selected 
in 2017 as the preferred bidder. This US$120m project is scheduled to 
generate approximately 280 gigawatt hours (GWh) per year and to 
sell electricity to EEP under a 20-year PPA. The development of the 
project has been assisted by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) Power Africa programme and the World Bank.
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Table 4.1 Non-hydro renewable energy IPPs 
under implementation in Ethiopia (as at 2021)
Project (energy 
source & region)
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Consortium led by 





125MW ACWA Power 90 0.02526 25
Dicheto 
(solar, Afar)
125MW ACWA Power 90 0.02526 25
Source: Authors’ compilation (based on information from project developers and government and 
donors’ websites).
Tulu Moye: This is a joint venture between Meridiam and Reykjavik 
Geothermal, which is now working on the first phase 50MW (of 150MW) 
generation (it began as a 520MW project, but has been scaled down). 
The company signed the PPA and the Implementation Agreement with 
EEP in December 2017 and restarted documentation in March 2019. The 
project is located about 100km south-east of Addis Ababa, in Oromia 
region. The project company – Tulu Moye Geothermal (TMGO) – has 
entrusted the work to Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen), 
which will drill around ten production wells and two injection wells at 
a cost of US$800m. TMGO plans to commission the first phase in 2023 
and the second phase in 2025. The company agreed to sell electric 
power for US$6.95 cents/kWh for the Ethiopian national grid.
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Figure 4.2 Project sites for renewable 
energy IPPs in Ethiopia
Source: GISGeography (2021).
Corbetti is the pioneer geothermal project that has a long history, as 
Reykjavik Geothermal signed a framework agreement with the then 
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation in October 2013. Since then, the 
project has made some progress and experienced some challenges, 
together with its twin project Tulu Moye, including downscaling 
capacity from 520MW to 150MW, to be implemented in two phases 
(50MW + 100MW). Its sponsors – InfraCo Africa (a Private Infrastructure 
Development Group company), Berkeley Energy (which manages 
the Africa Renewable Energy Fund), Iceland Drilling and Reykjavik 
Geothermal – also re-signed the PPA and Implementation Agreement 
with EEP in March 2020. The company agreed to sell electric power for 
US$7.53 cents/kWh for the Ethiopian national grid. The first phase of 
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4.4 Renewables IPP governance and 
project implementation challenges 
The main challenges of the renewable energy IPPs in practice are related 
to the governance framework, which is reflected through institutional 
tensions, governance fragmentation and limited capability. Moreover, 
research participants cited competition and transparency issues arising 
from unsolicited projects, as well as the undue influence of transaction 
advisors, as key factors. These elements are discussed in more detail below. 
4.4.1 Ambitious number and size of IPP projects
A significant number of respondents commented that the number and 
size (as well as the sequencing) of IPP projects prepared and floated for 
tender was too ambitious. They underlined that, for a country with no 
experience of any successfully implemented IPP projects, and limited 
implementation capacity, floating a substantial pipeline of projects 
(eight) in two successive tenders was unwise. Interviewees noted that, 
before jumping into tendering, lessons should have been learnt from 
Ethiopia’s own pre-PPP experience – i.e., from geothermal energy 
IPP projects that have been ongoing since 2013 (Transition Advisor, 
28 November 2019). Respondents also suggested that electricity generation 
targets at project level and in national plans were ‘too ambitious’.
We explored possible drivers of ambitious targets with respondents. 
Some said that setting high targets is a ‘perennial problem’ in Ethiopia 
– very much embedded in the ‘top-down developmental state’ growth 
and transformation plans (GTPs) (see section 6). They said many of the 
energy targets in the two successive GTPs were unmet. The key message 
coming from our respondents was that ‘unrealistic’ targets have been 
generating ‘false hopes’. Instead, they suggested focusing on one or two 
exemplar projects and implementing them effectively, demonstrating 
that IPPs can actually generate and supply electricity. They noted that 
this will reduce the complex issues of real and perceived risks related to 
currency convertibility, debt servicing and land access (see below). 
4.4.2 Institutional tensions 
Our in-depth interviews and consultation with stakeholders revealed 
institutional and professional tensions, notably between the PPP-DGU and 
EEP, due to overlapping roles and responsibilities between the agencies. 
With some difference in emphasis, both the PPP-DGU and EEP are tasked 
with identifying and evaluating the suitability of IPP projects; both are 
involved in the design and implementation of IPP tender documents, and 
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(re)negotiations with winning parties.21 To discharge its duties given by law, 
the PPP-DGU started by developing capacity (recruiting staff, etc.) from 
scratch. Many of our interviewees, notably those from EEP,22 strongly resent 
this overlap of roles and responsibilities, which wastes time and resources: 
... when the PPP framework came to effect [in 2018], we at EEP thought it 
would build on our ongoing experience with IPPs. But PPP-DGU started by 
building capacity at the Ministry of Finance. The DGU has no experience 
in the energy sector (nor in any PPP relevant sectors)… Now what 
happened was EEP’s roles and responsibilities were carved out and given 
to PPP-DGU. I see this as interfering with EEP’s business – our roles and 
responsibilities. PPP-DGU’s dominance in this procurement process makes 
EEP disempowered. 
(EEP 2, 25 November 2019)
The effect of these overlaps has meant that project development and 
management capacity for PPPs has to be developed in two sites. One 
official called this ‘absurd’, as it duplicates effort and adds to bureaucracy, 
which (according to some interviewees) opens up opportunities for 
misinterpretation and potentially adverse effects on public interest: 
To effectively engage a private supplier, one needs to be a tough 
negotiator... compared to us [EEP or PPP-DGU], the industry is very 
experienced and resourceful, it knows the strengths and weaknesses of 
our decision makers. [Even] compared to us, the industry can secure better 
access to our high-level decision makers, they use diplomatic routes, 
donors and funders. Unfortunately, our political decision makers know little 
about IPPs and, often out of goodwill, make quick decisions that could 
potentially be detrimental to the public interest.  
(EEP 1, 25 November 2019)
Yet, the PPP-DGU seems to justify its actions as part of the process of 
building the larger national development project: 
… Ministry of Finance and PPP-DGU build capacity to coordinate, not only 
IPPs, but all PPP projects across relevant sectors… Besides, EEP has not 
been creditworthy, we [MOF and PPP-DGU] give guarantees to suppliers to 
make it a credible and reliable off-taker.  
(Ministry of Finance 1, 25 November 2019)
21 See Proclamation 1076/2018 - Articles 13; 12 (5), 15 (1).
22 PPP-DGU interviewees also complained about the tension, identifying its source as ‘lack of clarity 
of roles and responsibilities’.
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But some EEP officials do not accept this argument. For them, ‘giving a 
guarantee is about managing macroeconomics’ and the PPP-DGU ‘should 
leave all technical matters’ to them.
Ironically, and despite the posturing, the PPP-DGU relies heavily on EEP 
technical expertise to discharge ‘its’ roles and responsibilities. But the 
consequences of the institutional and professional tensions over staff and 
their performance were very clear; these have, as we heard repeatedly 
from EEP officials, created deep feelings of being ‘disempowered’ and/or 
‘demotivated’, weakening individual and institutional abilities to take ‘own 
initiatives’ to address what might be referred to as ‘trivial matters’ without 
the direction and approval of the PPP-DGU. According to many of our 
research participants, this seemingly intractable problem simply prolongs the 
bureaucracy of decision-making processes. Respondents noted that, despite 
the contestations, EEP and the PPP-DGU work together, although not in 
sync. This appears out of necessity – the former wields to the ‘positional’ 
power of the Ministry of Finance (and the PPP-DGU) as it has been 
empowered by the Federal Government of Ethiopia ‘to design the Public 
Private Partnership programme to realize the government’s partnership with 
the private sector’ (Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation 2017). 
The Ministry of Finance also commands power over the allocation of the 
recurrent and capital budget that EEP depends on to develop PPP projects. 
4.4.3 Weak and fragmented renewable energy IPP governance
Respondents noted that overall, the governance of the electricity sector is 
fragmented and lacks coherence. Although by law, IPP project developers 
are required to follow PPP directives and start with the PPP-DGU or EEP as 
their entry point, many (particularly unsolicited proposal (USP) promoters 
– see below) find themselves caught between several agencies. Some 
start with EEP or MoWIE or even regional governments, as the policies and 
guidelines of these agencies command power over access to resources 
– for example, the Ministry of Finance on ensuring debt repayment 
guarantees, and regional governments on access to project sites. 
Interviewees also noted issues around representation of and participation 
in PPP Board meetings, and awareness levels among Board members (some 
of whom did not attend meetings regularly). Of the seven ministers and two 
private sector actors, there is no representation from regional governments 
to bring multiple perspectives to the decision-making process. Regional 
governments in particular command power over access to project sites, 
but the fact that their will and cooperation is not captured at the point 
of the Board’s decisions means possible delays in availing project sites to 
investors (as happened in the case of ACWA and Metehara projects). 
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Those close to the Board also admitted the ‘high turnover rate’ of officials, 
which makes it difficult to engage all members on the matters at hand. Many 
senior interviewees also said that Board members ‘lack knowledge and 
understanding’ of IPPs (and PPPs in general), suggesting that some members 
treat PPPs as ‘magic bullets’ and/or engineering, procurement and 
construction (EPC) projects. Some respondents also raised accountability 
issues for Board decisions: 
The Board makes collective decisions, but some members hardly know 
the technical aspects of the project under consideration or have the 
responsibility over the institution from which the projects emerge. There is 
no clear accountability mechanism for the decisions they take either.  
(MoWIE 1, 25 November 2019)
Some technical interviewees also noted cases of ‘political interference in 
identifying project sites’. For example, while the technical teams focus on 
grid connection, radiation/global horizon and environmental assessments, 
in some instances, political decisions are taken, especially if the proposed 
project would benefit opponents, the effect of which (according to 
interviewees) was to add ‘more risk to the investors or higher tariffs to pay’. 
4.4.4 Inadequacy of institutional and human capacity 
Similar to many sub-Saharan African countries, the Ethiopian power sector 
is characterised by lack of functional and competent institutions, which 
creates structural barriers to achieving universal electricity access and 
the development of renewable energy in the country (AfDB 2013; KfW 
Development Bank, GIZ and IRENA 2021). 
The design of an institutional structure is indicative of the policy priorities of 
the government. The current structure of MoWIE has been designed to reflect 
the importance of hydropower and the electrification programme, which 
are organised respectively under a dedicated Directorate of Hydropower 
Design and Study, and Directorate of Electrification (see Table 4.2). With the 
growing penetration of non-conventional renewable energy technologies, 
including wind and solar, a dedicated department that coordinates 
activities related to the development of renewables could be foreseen within 
MoWIE. According to respondents from MoWIE, EEA, EEP and EEU, activities 
related to the promotion and integration of renewables are shared among 
different departments (Table 4.2). This shared responsibility, or lack of clarity, 
on the mandates of each department for development of renewables could 
be a source of inefficiency, due to duplication of effort, high transaction 
costs and lack of accountability. Moreover, from a private investor’s 
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perspective, having a dedicated department or agency overlooking the 
development of renewable energy could make it easier to do business. 
Table 4.2 Departments involved in 
renewable energy activities
Institution Departments involved 
Ministry of Water, 
Irrigation and Energy 
(MoWIE)
– The Directorate of Energy Policy, Strategy and Information
– The Directorate of Hydropower Design and Study
– The Directorate of Electrification









– PPP Capacity Building and Knowledge Management Directorate
– Framework Management and Contract Support Directorate
– PPP Project Development and Monitoring Directorate
Ethiopian Electric 
Utility (EEU)
– Universal electricity access programme
Ethiopian Energy 
Authority (EEA)
– Energy, Research & Development, Measurement, 
Verification & Laboratory Test Directorate 
– Competency Certification & Technical Regulation Directorate
– Licensing & Economic Regulation Directorate 
– Geothermal Resource Development & Licensing Directorate
– Competency Certification & Technical Regulation Directorate
Source: Authors’ own, based on information from respondents.
All respondents indicated that the departments involved in the 
promotion and integration of renewable energy are not adequately 
staffed to implement the policies and programmes that have been 
introduced in the country to increase uptake of renewable energy. 
In general, it is evident that the capacity needs of the five institutions 
were in renewable energy project development and management. 
Interviewees’ views of the causes of capacity gaps varied. A senior 
EEP interviewee acknowledged capacity gaps, while interviewees 
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from the PPP-DGU strongly noted lack of staff with expertise in 
international finance and law, and in preparing IPP project bid 
documentation. However, EEP interviewees, consultants and transaction 
advisors for renewable energy IPP projects all noted that shortage 
of expertise within the PPP-DGU was arguably exacerbated by the 
system’s ‘inability to capitalise and build on expertise at EEP’:
 … the main reason for the capacity gap is lack of preparedness to handle 
matters at implementation stage – the policy was put in place, but we 
rushed into implementing it, with limited capacity to identify feasible 
projects, prepare tender documents, evaluate them, negotiate, etc. In fact, 
on tendering and evaluating tenders, we have become dependent on the 
investors themselves and advisors… We were supposed to be reviewing 
and correcting bidders’ documents but what has happened was we were 
guided by the investors or their proxies on how to go about it… based on a 
small number of projects, we should have had time to learn how to develop 
and manage IPP projects. [Yes]... the process maybe frustrating and may 
not be acceptable to investors, but still we are trying to be careful so that 
we don’t make irreversible mistakes. 
(EEP 1, 25 November 2019)
Moreover, many respondents (including from EEA) underlined limited 
capacity to effectively discharge their roles and responsibilities. In 
particular, it was noted that EEA lacks independence; because it depends 
on government for funding, its major decisions (such as on tariffs) are 
influenced by the government’s political agenda and priorities. 
To meet these capacity-building needs, EEA and MoWIE respondents 
agreed that academic training should be prioritised, followed by continuing 
education, vocational training in specialised centres, workshops and 
seminars, and e-learning. In contrast, EEU considers that its staff need 
short-term skill upgrading training in different expertise areas and 
on-the-job training through participation at project sites. Similar views 
were reflected by the PPP-DGU, which ranked on-the-job training as 
the second most suitable capacity-building approach, after workshops 
and seminars. EEP prioritises vocational training in specialised centres 
followed by continuous education, and workshops and seminars. 
All institutions considered periodic training, together with workshops, 
as important for efficient capacity-building. In addition, EEA and 
MoWIE consider that reviewing regulatory and legal texts related to 
the energy sector should be integrated in the design of capacity-
building programmes. Respondents held reservations about 
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e-learning, due to problems with internet connectivity and the 
practical nature of many aspects of training in the power sector. 
4.4.5 Unsolicited proposals and fair competition and transparency concerns
While a PPP project service is generally procured in response to a 
request or solicitation issued by the contracting authority (e.g. EEP), 
there is a legal provision23 under which unsolicited proposals (USPs) 
are submitted by ‘voluntary’ promoters for consideration. Such USPs 
need to be ‘unique’ and/or ‘innovative’ and be in the ‘national interest’ 
to be considered for a PPP. Should a USP meet the criteria, after 
recovering the promoter’s cost of project development, the PPP-DGU 
may allow such projects to be subjected to open competition.
We found that a significant number of USPs were reaching EEP. 
While on the face of it, increased interest in private procurement of 
renewable energy was most welcome, respondents revealed some 
serious concerns about the quality and manner in which these projects 
were presented to EEP. They also raised issues that pose challenges 
to EEP as an off-taker – potentially breaching transparency and fair 
competition rules. According to the interviewees, many USPs were ‘poorly 
prepared’ or did not have any unique ‘intellectual property-related 
issue’ or any ‘national significance’; they were simply projects promoted 
by private suppliers. A senior EEP interviewee went on to say: 
Bearing in mind the dual roles of EEP as a producer and an off-taker, if we 
accept a proposal for which we don’t have the absorption capacity, then 
we end up paying the costs. Our decision on whether to accept a USP 
thus depends on a number of factors, such as tariff rate, our absorption 
capacity, access to grid and transmission arrangements. As a developer, if 
we think we have enough feasible projects ourselves, EEP can reject USPs… 
in which case you may say our off-taker position is contestable.  
(EEP 1, 25 November 2019)
Moreover, in a bid to secure acceptance by the PPP-DGU, and the Board, 
USP promoters appear to vigorously mobilise support from federal and 
regional-level officials to liaise with EEP staff about their proposals, and 
request review and feedback: 
23 See Proclamation No. 1076, 2018, Chapter Nine.
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Many USP promoters, instead of directly submitting proposals to EEP, start 
with the Ministry or regional government offices or any official that they 
think will back them up… They come with letters of support by higher 
regional/federal governments officials24 to secure cooperation from us 
[EEP]… but these ‘facilitations’ put pressure on us whether to follow ‘orders’ 
or subject each proposal to due process as and when it arrives. The other 
problem here is the entire process lacks transparency as none of these 
influences or requests for support are openly available to all participants.  
(Participant in EEP/project management team group discussion, 
25 November 2019)
It is worth noting here that almost all respondents were quick to point 
out that such official endorsements were ‘generally in good faith’ and 
were meant to ‘address high demand for electricity in relation to supply’, 
although some staff observed that the emerging practices might 
infringe on fair competition, transparency and value for money.
More EEP interviewees noted that USPs ‘land’ on their desks formally or 
through informal routes for ‘comments’ in order to make the proposals 
‘compelling’ or secure a ‘buy-in’ from the experts and EEP. They said 
their internal system is ‘overwhelmed’ by these proposals. A group of EEP 
technical team members we spoke with also noted the ‘fear’ of making 
mistakes that grips them as they analyse USPs – i.e. they don’t want to 
end up making less feasible but politically supported projects. Lastly, 
many USPs tend to be too small even to justify the cost of processing, 
hence the PPP-DGU has already introduced a minimum target of 
US$50m for projects to make it worth the effort. More guidelines need 
to be developed on how to evaluate or restrict the number of USPs. 
4.4.6 Undue influence of donors and transaction advisors
IPP-led renewable project development has been supported by donors, 
notably by the Scaling Solar programme of the IFC, the private sector 
lending arm of the World Bank Group.25 One of the key support areas 
was assigning IFC transaction advisors to support project preparation in 
areas such as: technical and economic analysis; site identification; bid 
preparation and tender processes (including RfQ, RfP, proposal review and 
award); and finalising financial and final project approval, loan agreements 
and insurance. Another area of support has been the development of 
investment guarantee schemes. However, concerns were raised over the 
(implicit) influence of some transaction advisors and donors. Some were 
24 Including one seen by the researchers for this study.
25 See Scaling Solar, Ethiopia.
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said to be ‘pushing’ and/or ‘lobbying senior decision makers’ towards a 
particular outcome or one that Ministry of Finance officials considered to 
undermine the public interest. Referring to the first-round tender process that 
led to awards to ACWA, interviewees noted bias on the part of consultants 
and advisors towards a particular technology from particular sources:
Some [international] advisors were pressuring us [Ministry of Finance staff] 
to provide forex guarantees to potential winners… We felt that they were 
siding with the private sector rather than the public sector and we were 
convinced that their recommendation was not in our best interest, hence 
we stood up to the pressure. Some of the advisors withheld their technical 
support and they took the matter to the Board and accused [the Ministry 
of Finance DGU team] of giving ‘wrong’ advice… It sounded as if, unless we 
heeded to their recommendation, they wanted the whole bidding process 
to fall apart. Despite withholding their technical support, the PPP-DGU 
drew on EEP experts and recommended the award to ACWA. 
(PPP-DGU/Ministry of Finance 3, 25 November 2019)
With regards to donor influence, all interviewees acknowledged the 
wide-ranging support they have received, including financial support 
to undertake studies, hold events, or pay for consultants and 
transaction advisors.
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5. Renewable energy developers’ 
responses to PPP policy, 
institutions, and governance 
This section addresses how renewable energy IPP project developers 
(investors) have responded to IPP policy and governance, focusing on 
their interactions with federal and regional-level officials, donors or 
development finance institutions, highlighting project risks they identified. 
5.1 Summary of industry responses to 
renewable energy IPP policy and governance
Particularly since 2013, an increasing number of private entities have been 
drawn into Ethiopia’s renewable energy sector. Among equity investors, 
there are specialised technology providers (Reykjavik Geothermal), asset 
management companies (Meridiam), multilateral energy corporations 
(Enel, Engie and ACWA), and regional/local infrastructure developers 
(Orchid Business Group26 and KenGen). Renewable energy developers 
and financiers we spoke with underlined that their attraction to Ethiopia 
was based on a range of factors that include untapped resources and 
unmet demand, a growing economy with high demand for electricity, 
strong government policy backed up by ambitious targets and a range 
of incentives. One former renewable energy company manager noted:
Ethiopia is the power hub not only of Eastern Africa, but the whole of Africa. 
So, there is a huge resource potential, and there is also a huge demand. 
And access to electricity is very low. The population size is more than 110 
million… which makes it the biggest market in terms of market opportunity.  
(Private developer 4, April 2021)
Another project company manager noted:
We know PPP is in its infancy when it comes to Ethiopia. [Still] the energy 
liberalisation modality it has taken and the international competitive 
nature of the IPP are the reasons for our company to engage in the 
Ethiopian market.  
(Private developer 1, April 2021)
26 The only Ethiopian company involved in any IPPs and here it is a junior partner of Enel.
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Beside project developers and equity investors, tenders on renewable energy 
IPPs also attracted EPC contractors and debt financiers worldwide. Likewise, 
a large number of service and consultancy companies entered the Ethiopian 
energy market to provide various advisory services on the engineering, 
legal, and financial aspects of IPPs for both the public and private sectors. 
As a result, a growing and dynamic business community is now taking 
shape in Ethiopia. These actors are serving not only as the ‘prime movers’ 
of the industry, but also crucial knowledge-brokers to nurture the expertise 
necessary for the long-term development of renewable energy IPPs: 
I believe that opening up the sector to the private developers will give relief 
for the government, and then also it will get the opportunity for the private 
investors to do this kind of business in such untapped markets, because 
the opportunity is big enough, but the government by itself cannot do 
everything at the moment.  
(Private developer 3, April 2021)
5.2 Engaging with federal-level 
government agencies 
Many industry respondents were cognisant of the fact that the industry is 
nascent in Ethiopia and faces many challenges, mindful that, alongside 
the government, they also have a vested interest in its development:
Look, we’re developing a new sector here together, it is a new thing for 
Ethiopia, so their [government] success is our success and our success is 
their success. 
(Private developer 2, April 2020)
As also noted in the literature (Warsen et al. 2018), underlining any PPP 
arrangement is a trust-based relationship between public and private 
entities to jointly develop the sector. The establishment of the PPP-DGU was 
intended to streamline the decision-making processes on IPP projects, yet 
the institutional reforms have further complicated relations within different 
government entities and units. Respondents noted that, owing to frequent 
staff turnover, they regularly have to deal with new and less experienced 
personnel, prolonging the business deals at hand. Some respondents 
also commented that, while top decision makers appear to be driving 
the energy liberalisation agenda, middle- and junior-level bureaucrats 
were rather slow and do not seem to have embraced that agenda. 
Many respondents noted ‘little’ or ‘no’ change in the ‘mindset’ towards 
a liberalised energy sector among lower-level staff. Thus, many industry 
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actors have to navigate a highly supportive environment (mostly at senior 
level) and a not-so-supportive environment (at middle and lower levels). 
Some company leaders noted the need to ‘think long term’ and be ‘flexible’ 
as they operate in what is sometimes an ‘unclear’ policy environment. 
Our data suggests that the companies that have a better appreciation 
of the complex realities on the ground are those that have made 
serious commitments to develop projects, despite all the difficulties and 
uncertainties involved. We found many examples where perseverance 
led to positive outcomes. One example is the downscaling of the 
Corbetti and Tulu Moye geothermal IPP projects from 520MW to 
150MW. Both developers (and, subsequently, government officials 
too) noted that the original targets were driven by a strong political 
aspiration, but with little realism brought to the negotiations.
In the main, project developers clearly appreciated the government’s 
ambitions and aspirations, but some (such as TMGO) brought to 
their attention the financial as well as technical risks with such large 
projects, and managed to persuade the authorities to downscale 
them. According to respondents, this ‘helped them to de-risk’ the 
projects and put them on a more ‘realistic and attainable path’: 
I think just to try and sit them [government officials] down so that private 
companies can challenge and ask the questions can be a progress… Here 
we made the case, we said let’s walk before we can run. And I think that 
would be helpful, as it proved in our case, for the whole PPP pipeline that 
the Ministry of Finance in Ethiopia has and wants to deliver. 
(Private developer 2, April 2021)
5.3 Engaging with local actors
Beyond federal-level actors, our interviews revealed two major areas of 
weakness in actor engagements: the PPP policy does not provide enough 
support to the domestic private sector; and regional and local-level 
government actors are peripheral to the energy-related decision-making 
process. The overwhelming majority of respondents noted that the Ethiopian 
private sector is too weak to participate in or partner with international 
IPPs. They noted that there is only one junior partner at Enel Green Power27 
(Metehara 100MW solar PV), and that the PPP policy is not ‘bold enough’ 
to develop the sector. That said, the guidelines (Ministry of Finance 2019: 
24–26) appear to have developed some instruments that favour local 
businesses, where ‘a margin of up to 7 per cent of bonus may be allocated 
27 See Enel Green Power – Ethiopia.
49Research Report Volume 2021 Number 87 
Renewable Energy Procurement in Ethiopia: Overcoming Obstacles in 
Procurement from Independent Power Producers
ids.ac.uk
to the financial proposal [of RfP] provided by the bidders when the capital 
share of the domestic party is more than 50 per cent and the following 
conditions are fulfilled: (a) for a project involving a construction phase, 
if at least 30 per cent of the raw materials used are from Ethiopia and 
50 per cent of the employees are Ethiopians; and (b) when 50 per cent 
of Ethiopians are involved in the project/company management’. 
As noted in section 4, the need to nurture the domestic private sector 
becomes important in the face of mounting challenges in attracting 
international suppliers. In the medium term and long term, a viable 
domestic private sector could mitigate (for example) the forex supply 
and currency convertibility issues (Ayele, Shen and Worako 2021). 
Some respondents noted the limited engagement of regional and local-level 
government actors in the energy sector decision-making processes: 
according to the Constitution, land is owned by the state and regional 
governments have the duty to administer land and other natural resources. 
Renewable energy IPPs, solicited and unsolicited, are initiated in a top-down 
manner, with central government agencies (particularly EEP) taking the 
lead, but little or no involvement of regional and sub-regional authorities 
(woredas28 in particular) in the formal decision-making processes on project 
selection and preparation. Such a top-down approach may be deemed to 
be efficient, yet it could lead to tensions and contestations for IPP project 
developers, who often directly engage with local officials and communities. 
We found that, owing to such limitations, the Metehara PV project site had 
to be relocated more than once as the local woreda administration was 
said to have allocated the piece of land originally allotted to the project 
to another ‘development project’. Subsequently, there were delays in the 
environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) on the basis that the 
proposed project site was also found to be in conflict with a local irrigation 
programme. It took another year for EEP to address these challenges.
That said, some companies invest in community-based development 
projects alongside their renewable energy IPP and create so-called 
‘social license’ (Vanclay and Hanna 2019) beneficial to both the company 
and the local community. TMGO, for example, established a dedicated 
community liaison unit led by local staff with dedicated budget to 
support community development initiatives such as water and road 
access. The company spent approximately US$500,000 (less than 
1 per cent of its initial investment) to support local communities: 
28 A woreda is made up of kebeles (the smallest localised administrative unit of Ethiopia) and is 
roughly equivalent to a district.
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We recognise that they [local communities] are going to be our neighbours 
for 30 years. They very much have a hand in whether the project is a 
success or a failure.  
(Private developer 2, April 2021)
According to that interviewee, the result was highly rewarding. The 
relationship it had built with the community was critical to sparing 
TMGO from destruction during civil disturbances and violence in 
2020. Interviewees boldly noted that the good relations they had 
built with the community were a major factor in protecting their 
investments and site facilities (private developer 2, April 2021).
5.4 Engaging with development finance 
institutions and multilateral/bilateral donors
Renewable energy IPPs depend critically on the intellectual and financial 
inputs from bilateral and multilateral donors and development finance 
institutions. For example, USAID’s Power Africa programme has been 
playing a prominent role by providing advisory services for the procurement 
and development of the Metehara project. The Danish Energy Agency 
and DANIDA have also been assisting on developing capacities around 
renewable energy projects’ development. Although Tulu Moye and Corbetti 
geothermal projects are not directly supported by international donors, 
the Government of Iceland and Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) have been supporting the initial drilling activities in Ethiopia under the 
World Bank’s Ethiopia Geothermal Sector Development Project (GSDP).
The World Bank Group in particular plays a major role in the development 
of renewable energy IPPs in Ethiopia, mainly through its umbrella Renewable 
Energy Guarantees Programme (REGREP). It has provided a comprehensive 
package of support, including an overall financial envelope of US$200m 
(for equity and debt), (IFC) advisory services as transaction advisor, IDA 
(International Development Association) guarantees, MIGA’s (Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency) political risk insurance, plus IFC blended 
finance to potential investors (World Bank 2019a). The ultimate goal is to 
mobilise over US$1.5bn in private investment for at least 1GW of solar and 
wind capacities in Ethiopia by 2025. It should be noted that the IDA payment 
guarantees are essentially partial guarantees, amounting to US$10m for 
the Metehara project (compared to total cost of US$100m), and to US$25m 
for two Scaling Solar projects (compared to total cost of US$300m) (ibid.).
REGREP is essentially designed for the credit enhancement and 
de-risking of renewable energy IPPs to make them bankable projects. 
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Meanwhile, extensive capacity-building programmes are designed via 
a Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) grant, IDA credits, 
Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF) and Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Programme (ESMAP) grants to support EEP and PPP-DGU’s 
due diligence on the transactions, plus IFC advisory and USAID/Power 
Africa, which provide additional transaction advisory support. Many 
interviewees expressed concerns about the uncertain prospects of this 
programme, and were hesitant about participating further in Scaling 
Solar tenders. Considering that REGREP’s main purpose is to boost 
private sector involvement in the development of the renewable energy 
sector, the critical task at hand is to restore the confidence of project 
developers and related entities, mainly by reaching financial close of 
awarded renewable energy IPPs before the next round of tenders. 
5.5 Risk perceptions and financial close 
Over three years of significant progress has been made in institutional 
reforms and market development, yet, at the time of writing, neither 
of the solar PV projects that has gone through the renewable energy 
IPP tender process has reached financial close. For any IPP or PPP 
arrangement, the mutually accepted scheme for sharing risk between the 
public and private entities involved is the foundational basis. However, 
according to our respondents, profound finance-related risks prevail.
The biggest risk factor relates to forex availability and convertibility 
of the birr to international currency. Interviews reveal that the sticking 
point is the government’s reluctance to provide guarantees for forex 
availability and convertibility to renewable energy IPP developers 
and debt financiers. Ethiopia’s debt service, though not among 
the worst in the sub-Saharan Africa region, is certainly a concern, 
particularly as it recovers from the Covid-19 pandemic. Even before 
the pandemic, its total debt was close to US$30bn and its debt 
service ratio around 29 per cent (in 2019) (World Bank Data 2021).
Project developers and debt financiers are concerned not just about the 
overall shortage of forex but the extent to which repayments of foreign 
currency can be prioritised in the convertibility pipeline. Delays in accessing 
foreign currency are expected to be between 4 and 12 months for essential 
imports and up to three years for non-essential imports, which differs 
between banks (Lloyd and Teshome 2018). Our interviews illustrate that the 
electricity sector traditionally has some advantages in the convertibility 
hierarchy and the waiting period for foreign currency is generally shorter 
than projects in other sectors, yet such favourable status is never formally 
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institutionalised. This imposes enormous uncertainty, particularly for lenders, 
as the major hurdle for all renewable energy IPPs in reaching financial close. 
That said, some local consultancies and legal experts believe that 
convertibility risks can be overrated among private investors or debt 
financiers, particularly as they entered the Ethiopian market only recently. 
My bigger question is why IPP is so special? We have investors doing 
bigger projects all these years without asking for convertibility guarantees 
from the government.  
(Legal advisor 1, April 2021)
In the long term, however, the ultimate solution lies in improving recovery 
and growth of the export sector. EEP is also expected to increase electricity 
exports to neighbouring countries like Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya, as 
Ethiopian exporting sectors have priority in utilising forex according to 
current regulations. As discussed earlier, another potential route is to 
nurture local manufacturing capacity on renewable energy equipment 
to reduce reliance on imports, particularly for some basic spare parts. 
Compared to the forex risks, the off-taker risk of EEP is viewed by 
private entities and financiers as less significant, mainly because its 
payment obligations under PPAs are guaranteed by the government.
Security risk: Another important risk highlighted by respondents is the 
deteriorating security situation in Ethiopia, particularly in Tigray, Amhara 
and Afar, where civil conflict and ethnic-based political tensions have led to 
armed conflicts that are ravaging the country. This is often conflated with 
global geopolitics and use of ‘soft’ power to derail investment flows into 
Ethiopia unless the conflict is resolved. MIGA’s political risk guarantees can be 
a powerful tool to mitigate security risk, but it is not yet clear whether they are 
still available to investors and financiers who are not using the World Bank 
and IFC’s financial package, such as Gad and Dicheto solar PV projects. 
Under the current situation, there can be very few political risk insurers willing 
to provide political risk guarantees for Ethiopian projects. Even if they do, 
the premium could be excessive, and therefore impact on the agreed tariff.
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That said, many among the business community remain positive:
As a business, as an investor, if you don’t invest in Ethiopia and enter the 
market now, you’ll be crying in ten years’ time. If you do enter the Ethiopian 
market now and invest, you’ll be crying for the next ten years.  
(Private developer 2, April 2021) 
In sum, at the time of our interviews, investors remained optimistic, citing 
Ethiopia’s untapped renewable energy resources and demand to grow 
investment. However, the fault lines described here – most notably forex and 
security-related risks – have been constraining procurement of electricity 
from private suppliers.
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6. Discussion of main findings 
The newly established PPP framework has laid a solid foundation for the 
future development of (non-hydro) renewable energy projects in Ethiopia. 
Yet, notable challenges remain around target-setting, overlapping roles 
and functions, capacity deficiencies, and risk to private sector investment. 
We now discuss each of these in turn, with a view to identifying 
potential solutions.
6.1 Setting achievable targets: meshing 
top-down and bottom-up approaches
For decades, Ethiopia pursued a top-down developmental state strategy, 
during which time electricity generation and distribution policies and 
decisions were ‘focused on a centralized, top-down approach’ (Gordon 
2018; Lavers, Terrefe and Gebresenbet 2021). While regional governments 
have respective bureaus for Water, Irrigation and Energy Development, 
the generation and grid-level transmission remain federal government 
functions. Over recent decades, the generation and distribution of electricity 
was guided by two successive GTPs that fit this characterisation (NPC 
2016). Our fieldwork and secondary data also clearly show that ambitious 
goals for generation of electricity manifest on at least three levels.
National goals: GTP I (2010/11–2014/15) planned to increase Ethiopia’s power 
generation capacity from 2,000MW in 2009/10 to 8,000MW by 2014/15. 
But only 52 per cent of that target (4,180MW) was reached by 2014/15. GTP 
II planned to increase generation capacity to a very ambitious 17,341MW 
(NPC 2016) but by 2020, it had reached only 4,478MW (NPC 2020). 
At project level: Ethiopian IPPs tend to be larger than those of 
their neighbours (Gordon 2018). As discussed in section 5, the two 
geothermal IPP projects started with a target of 520MW each but 
were eventually downscaled to 150MW. Our evidence suggests 
the need for a more bottom-up approach, involving regional and 
local government actors in planning specific project sites and sizes, 
before and during negotiations with IPP project developers.
In the pace and sequencing of projects: Before the Gad and Dicheto 
sites were sufficiently developed, a second-round tender was floated 
for six more projects, and many more are in the pipeline. This is without 
accounting for the large number of unsolicited IPP proposals. 
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The key question, therefore, is: what drives these ambitious targets? Targets 
are clearly related to the demand and supply side forces and associated 
policy narratives. The demand side is fuelled by fast economic growth and 
population growth, and the government’s desire to reach lower middle-
income status by 2025. Equally, on the supply side, the policy-focused 
narrative of Ethiopia being a ‘tower of energy’ with untapped wind, solar 
and geothermal resources is also a driver. But does this mean that high 
targets are achievable? The simple answer, as confirmed by the evidence 
presented in this study, is ‘no’. As Lavers et al. (2021: 20) note, officials also 
appear to ‘informally’ encourage high target-setting, but are prepared to 
accept below-target achievements: ‘… plan for 100% [achievement of the 
targets] but 60% is good’. Yet overambitious targets, both at national level 
and at project level, can result from either technical inaccuracies or political 
motivations. Therefore, there is a need for more prudent modelling that 
accounts for political influence in planning (Dye 2020; Süsser et al. 2021). 
Moreover, as this study has shown, the exploitation of resource potentials and 
market opportunities very much hinges on a variety of conditions, ranging 
from timely availing of land to securing project finance. The lessons learnt 
from the Metehara project (section 5) indicate the importance of having an 
inclusive decision-making process to avoid delays in project implementation. 
They also show that an ideal project site and size must emerge from a 
thorough consideration of choices between optimal technical, financial, 
economic, and political options. If a large number of projects are stuck in 
the pipeline, the limited institutional and human resources capacity will be 
further stretched in dealing with multiple and simultaneous negotiations.
6.2 IPP governance: balancing 
institutional roles and coordination 
Early-stage institutional reforms may lead to overlaps or even a vacuum 
in some regulatory functions among newly created units and existing 
ones. In the case of renewable energy IPPs in Ethiopia, the major problem 
is the duplication of roles between EEP and the PPP-DGU in evaluating 
and approving projects. Like many countries in the region, Ethiopia faces 
a dual challenge of financial constraints and notable technical gaps in 
supporting such projects. Whereas the publicly funded EEP has relatively less 
incentive to ensure the financial feasibility of projects, the PPP-DGU (under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Finance) has limited sectoral expertise 
in reviewing and approving the technical aspects of the proposals. In this 
regard, the ideal option (at least in theory) would be for the two entities to 
jointly review and approve the financial and technical aspects of project 
proposals. Yet in reality, our investigation revealed that the PPP-DGU has 
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taken over the decision-making functions of the project proposal process, 
on both financial and technical aspects, and the ensuing contestations 
are delaying the whole decision-making process. In this regard, the 
Ministry of Finance and the PPP-DGU could focus on the macro or cross-
sectoral management, such as issues around the provision of sovereign 
guarantees and prudent budget plans for PPPs across different economic 
sectors. MoWIE (and utility companies), as the guardian ministry for the 
electricity sector, could be the appropriate agency to take up procurement 
design and awarding – a task that is closely linked to broader sectoral 
reforms and development planning. EEP, as the monopoly utility, needs 
to focus on project-level negotiations as the sole off-taker. Such an 
arrangement, supported by clearer roles and responsibilities, would avoid 
overlapping governance duties among these agencies and would be 
the most effective way to utilise their respective areas of expertise.
Still, Ethiopia’s experience is similar to that of other sub-Saharan African 
countries, whereby a monopoly power generation and transmission utility 
may well deter renewable energy IPP projects, such as in South Africa. 
However, South Africa has a dedicated renewable energy REIPPPP office 
jointly hosted by the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, the 
National Treasury, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, with 
sole responsibility for delivering renewable energy IPP projects. EEP, as 
the sole buyer of electricity, and power generator and transmitter utility in 
Ethiopia, has a dual role in procuring renewable energy IPP projects, both 
as a competitor for energy generation and off-taker for power purchase. 
Such dual roles appear to be affecting EEP’s motivation to engage with 
unsolicited IPP project promoters. In addition, wind, solar, and geothermal 
projects are relatively new energy sources compared to the hydropower 
sector that has dominated the energy landscape in Ethiopia for decades. 
If EEP is to remain as the monopoly power generation and transmission 
utility, at least in the short term, it would be ideal to establish a more 
dedicated and specialised unit within it, focusing on the off-taker side 
of negotiations and documentation under renewable energy IPPs. 
Putting utility companies at the centre of developing renewable 
energy IPPs does not mean that other agencies are less relevant; quite 
the contrary. The governance institutions should be considered as 
a multi-level decision-making system wherein different government 
agencies contribute to the process throughout various stages, 
based on their respective roles and responsibilities, and expertise. 
Thus, besides the Ministry of Finance (PPP-DGU), MoWIE, and EEP, 
the role of other agencies in the decision-making process should 
also be properly considered, including but not limited to the National 
Bank of Ethiopia, EEA, and regional and local governments.
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6.2.1 Towards a new state-market relationship
Previous studies indicate that a more constructive and symbiotic 
relationship is needed between key government entities and private 
sector organisations to develop and maintain an effective and influential 
policy coalition or network (Rennkamp et al. 2017; Shen 2017). It should 
be noted that any policy coalition promoting policy changes is both 
value- and interest-driven (Sabatier 1987). In the case of renewable 
energy IPPs in Ethiopia, international donors and private sector actors are 
involved in various project development processes (see Figure 6.1), and any 
coalition should be built around two core belief systems: a commitment 
to (non-hydro) renewables in Ethiopia’s future energy landscape; and a 
commitment to the role of the private sector in achieving these potentials. 
However, this study has shown that whereas most of the private sector 
and multilateral organisations have strong faith in both dimensions 
(see Figure 6.1), key government agencies have less well-established 
confidence in either non-hydro renewables or market-based solutions. 
This issue is particularly acute among managers at the operational level. 
Some (particularly middle-level) government officials have been sceptical 
of the private sector. For decades, except for businesses aligned with the 
government (often on partisan lines), many businesses have been labelled 
as ‘rent-seekers’ (Lavers et al. 2021). As illustrated in Figure 6.1, on the one 
hand, the PPP-DGU as a cross-sectoral agency has strong commitment 
to IPPs in general, but lacks expertise to drive and support non-hydro 
renewables. On the other hand, EEP in general aims to promote non-hydro 
renewable capacities but it is not yet fully convinced of the IPP model. As 
a result, no leading government agency is keen to develop lasting and 
cooperative relations with the private sector, to nurture renewable energy 
IPPs together as the ‘niche’ market and governance segment. In reality, 
this misaligned arrangement can lead to hesitation or lack of trust among 
government officials in engaging and negotiating with private sector actors.
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Figure 6.1 Two core belief systems that sustain 
policy coalitions around renewable energy IPPs
Source: Authors’ own.
However, developing a constructive state-market relationship requires 
efforts from both sides. Private sector organisations need to understand 
and be patient with government officials as the latter try to protect 
the public interest, while also operating with multiple forms of capacity 
deficit. Mutual respect and appreciation of resource needs, as well as 
exchange of knowledge, is critical to a successful policy coalition. 
6.3 Capacity development 
This study has shown that the new electricity generation model 
from private suppliers faces serious capacity gaps, notably in the 
areas of international law and finance, debt management, tender 
preparation, and documentation. Underpinning the gaps are shortages 
of suitably skilled personnel, poorly designed capacity-building 
programmes, and lack of retention of qualified staff.
This study has also revealed that during previous capacity-building 
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renewable energy IPP projects. This is often because officials view wind, 
solar, and geothermal sectors as peripheral energy sources. Having a 
dedicated team working on non-hydro renewable energy sources would 
enhance the status of non-hydro sectors and help transform mid-level and 
junior officers’ perceptions of their future roles in Ethiopia’s energy mix. 
A dedicated team of expertise on non-hydro electricity should be 
developed, through recruiting new staff and retraining existing staff, 
reorienting capacity-building programmes to renewable energy IPPs, 
and filling gaps in training facilities and logistics. Finally, retention of 
trained experts is another key challenge facing these institutions. 
Staff turnover should be minimised by creating career structures 
and promotion opportunities within the relevant agencies. 
6.3.1 Demonstrate an exemplar project
Last but not least is the importance of learning by doing. It should be 
made clear that capacity-building in itself cannot replace the learning-
by-doing process needed during the deep and rapid transition from 
government-led development of IPPs, no matter how well these programmes 
are designed and implemented. Lessons and experiences should be 
carefully studied, recorded and shared within and between different 
units and project negotiation and implementation teams to accelerate 
the learning curve. Capacity gaps should not be used as an excuse 
to halt or postpone negotiations and deals. Officials should be given 
some breathing space for possible miscalculation and even mistakes, 
particularly for the first few transactions, as part of the learning journey. 
6.4 Risk management 
Besides governance flaws and capacity gaps, the most immediate 
challenge in implementing renewable energy IPPs in Ethiopia is the risk 
that they will be put on hold, for reasons that include the shortage and 
convertibility of foreign currency, and security risks. Project developers and 
financiers are concerned about the actual availability and convertibility of 
the foreign currency to repay the loans, even though the current Investment 
Proclamation (No. 1180/2020) clearly confirms that foreign investors have 
the right to repatriate all their profits and dividends abroad, to repay 
external loans and for other purposes (Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia 2020). The other related concern is uncertainty regarding the actual 
duration of the waiting period for renewable energy IPPs to expatriate the 
profits they make. If the waiting period remains unpredictable, then it is 
even more difficult to seek protection from currency-hedging arrangements 
in the financial markets, as there is no way to determine the cut-off date 
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for these costly currency swaps. A government policy that clarifies and 
reduces anxiety among investors and financiers would help. For example, 
there should be a maximum waiting period for each IPP’s request for 
foreign currency, plus a confirmation of non-differential treatment between 
state-owned enterprises and IPPs in securing forex. These moves would 
dissipate fears about being treated detrimentally among foreign investors. 
Forex earned through EEP’s electricity exports could be utilised as an 
additional layer of security for the convertibility risks. According to the recent 
directive from the National Bank of Ethiopia, 31.5 per cent of total foreign 
currency inflow can be retained by exporters (NBE 2021) and EEP is generating 
an average of US$70m annually (EEP 2021), which means that over US$21m is 
available each year. In theory, some of these funds could be escrowed to a 
dedicated account for all implemented IPPs in case of any foreign currency 
loss incurred beyond the expected waiting period. Such an approach 
would certainly be subject to approval by the National Bank of Ethiopia 
and the Ministry of Finance. The World Bank and IFC could also provide 
back-up funding to further strengthen the escrow account arrangement. 
Finally, Ethiopia ratified the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) on 24 August 
2020, which helps to increase its attractiveness for foreign investment. 
Currently, Ethiopia applies the New York Convention only to commercial 
disputes (contractual and non-contractual) on any signatory country, 
therefore any arbitration involving government entities requires a waiver of 
sovereign immunity in advance, which is not yet a standard clause under 
renewable energy IPPs but needs to be acquired on a case-by-case basis. 
As for security risk to investors, the World Bank’s MIGA provides political 
risk insurance (PRI) that includes War and Civil Disturbance coverage for 
Scaling Solar projects, which covers both loss from tangible assets and 
business interruption caused by politically motivated acts of war or civil 
disturbance in the country, including revolution, insurrection, coups d’état, 
sabotage, and terrorism (MIGA 2021). Other PRI providers or export credit 
agencies can provide similar coverage but normally with higher premium 
rates than that offered by MIGA, which stands at around 1 per cent of the 
insured amount each year for average risks. The current situation in Ethiopia 
means that the actual PRI premium may be significantly higher than this 
benchmark, which could undermine the financial viability of IPP projects. 
It should be noted that PRI can only cover major damage to assets and 
business interruption, but not insignificant losses from small-scale crimes 
and non-political incidents. Therefore, apart from PRI coverage, the other 
crucial risk mitigation strategy for security risks is maintaining close relations 
with the local government and communities throughout the project cycle. 
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During the project construction and maintenance phase, the overall 
security of the project would also rely largely on the relationship with the 
local government and community, as it is unrealistic to expect the federal 
government to provide security support project sites on a daily basis. 
Therefore, building community relationships is not just a corporate social 
responsibility consideration, but in fact a crucial risk mitigation tool. 
6.4.1 Off-taker risks amid institutional transition and sovereign debt crisis 
The success of renewable energy IPPs depends ultimately on the 
de-coupling of the off-taker risk of EEP from the sovereign balance sheet, 
which seems to be unrealistic in the near future given the EEP’s financial 
status. In the long term, EEP must act as a creditworthy off-taker of the 
electricity generated by IPPs. The World Bank has developed a power sector 
reform roadmap with the Government of Ethiopia, which contains several 
notable structural reforms in order to achieve that goal (World Bank 2019a). 
One proposal is to separate transmission and generation activities, whereby 
the power generation wing would be responsible for building and operating 
power plants, and the power transmission wing would work on expanding 
and maintaining transmission lines. Alongside institutional reforms are tariff 
reforms that started in 2018. Ethiopia has the lowest electricity tariffs in the 
region, which partially explains why the utility company operates at a loss. 
The reforms included an incremental increase in tariff rates over four years 
(from 2018 to 2022), with a minor increase for the first 12 months followed 
by a progressively steeper annual increase until 2022 (Tesfamichael et al. 
2021). Meanwhile, subsidies are no longer available under the new tariff 
system for any consumer using more than 50 kWh/month, as beyond that 
threshold consumers must pay at an unsubsidised and much higher rate. 
The separation of generation and transmission plus a less subsidised 
tariff system would enhance the overall efficiency of the energy system, 
as illustrated in many countries (Goto, Inoue and Sueyoshi 2013; 
Baker et al. 2021b). However, it should be noted that the benefits of 
these reforms may take years to take effect, and the actual change 
of market participants’ risk perceptions on EEP’s off-taker risk can 
take even longer, particularly for long-term PPAs over 20 or 25 years. 
Therefore, in the short term and medium term, sovereign credit will 
still serve as the ultimate guarantor for renewable energy IPPs. 
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7. Conclusion and recommendations 
Ethiopians are energy poor, and availability of and access to energy 
is a development imperative. In 2017, Ethiopia took bold policy 
action to transition its energy sector to non-hydro renewables, a 
segment of which was to be procured by private suppliers. 
Efforts thus far are showing credible progress: PPAs were signed 
with five IPPs to increase generation by 650MW, and many more 
projects are in the pipeline. Over 90 per cent of the country’s current 
4,478MW generation capacity comes from hydroelectric power, but 
Ethiopia aims to increase generation from a mix of renewables such 
as hydropower, solar and wind power to 17,056MW by 2030. The share 
of non-hydropower sources is planned to increase to 27.5 per cent, a 
large proportion of which will be procured privately through IPPs. The 
country also aims to raise electricity coverage from 44 per cent of its 
117 million population to 100 per cent by 2030, to meet the SDG ‘Ensure 
access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’. 
Ethiopia has rich and untapped energy resources and growing 
demand for electricity, fuelled by a fast-growing economy and 
population. However, this study has found major fault lines that 
are impeding the implementation of IPP projects, as follows.
The number and size of IPP projects is too ambitious: Two tenders 
were announced in quick succession. By many standards within the 
sub-Saharan African region, IPP project sizes also tend to be large, adding 
risk to investment. We found that ambitious energy plans are inherent 
in the system and driven by policy narratives that emphasise Ethiopia’s 
rich renewable resources and unmet demand, but with less attention to 
institutional and technical capacity to plan implementation, and the risks 
that investors face as they raise project finance and implement projects. 
Planners appear to see IPP projects as ‘magic bullet’ solutions, which 
can create false optimism. We recommend that target-setting be more 
realistic and firmly based on the understanding of complex factors such as 
risk to investors. Project size and sites should emerge from considerations 
of choices between optimal technical, financial, economic, and political 
options. A large number of projects stuck in the pipeline will only overstretch 
the limited institutional and technical capacity when dealing with multiple 
and simultaneous negotiations. The immediate focus should be on 
designing and implementing an exemplar project and generating lessons 
that can address many of the (seemingly intractable) challenges.
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IPP governance is rife with institutional tensions: Overlapping roles 
and responsibilities between the PPP-DGU and EEP are the main 
cause of these tensions, with political and technical differences at the 
core. EEP feels its roles and responsibilities have been ‘appropriated’ 
by the PPP-DGU, while the latter has limited capacity to prepare and 
implement tenders. These tensions appear to have disempowered 
and demotivated staff at EEP and slowed down the tendering process. 
Core institutions need to draw on their competency areas and work in 
sync to succeed. We suggest that the PPP-DGU focus on provision of 
sovereign guarantees for IPPs, while EEP, as an off-taker, could focus 
on all the technical aspects of electricity procurement via IPPs.
Weak and fragmented IPP governance: The governance of renewables, 
relevant policies and requisite technical expertise for managing projects 
are dispersed across the main institutions, and there is no ‘one-stop-shop’ 
for investors, which impedes the procurement process. While IPP project 
developers are required to follow PPP directives and start with EEP and/or 
the PPP-DGU as their entry point, many find themselves caught between 
several agencies. Some start with the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and 
Energy or even regional governments as the policies and guidelines of these 
agencies command power over access to resources. Lack of coordination 
between central and regional governments over availability of project 
sites is one challenge. Regional governments are not formally involved in 
the decision-making process, but they play a critical role in making land or 
project sites available to investors and to project implementation on the 
ground. We recommend that the PPP-DGU and EEP increase awareness 
among key institutions involved in IPPs and the project tender processes, 
making procedures clear and circulating them widely, including via websites.
IPP project preparation and implementation face capacity deficits: 
Key institutions, including the PPP-DGU, experience dire shortages of 
expertise and skills in finance, law, and preparation of bid documents. 
Existing expertise and skills in the system tend to be skewed towards 
hydropower development. Institutions have taken the short-term solution 
of implementing capacity-building programmes, and hiring transaction 
advisors and consultants. We recommend that relevant institutions 
work together, identifying and capitalising on existing capacity. In the 
medium to long term, there needs to be a conducive environment for 
training, attracting and retaining staff, and developing clear career 
pathways within the organisations, with improved salary scales.
Increasing interest in unsolicited proposals is putting undue pressure 
on EEP technical teams: While an IPP project service is generally 
procured in response to a request by EEP and/or the PPP-DGU, a 
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large number of unsolicited proposals are submitted by ‘voluntary’ 
promoters for consideration. This study found that not one such 
project had been approved, yet a significant number are regularly 
submitted to EEP staff. As there does not seem to be transparency 
(and fair competition) in evaluating these projects, there is a need for 
guidelines as to how they should be processed and evaluated.
Investors face major project risks, real and perceived: The main challenge 
has been foreign currency availability, and convertibility of birr to foreign 
currencies. Availability is a reflection of a sustained unhealthy status 
of Ethiopia’s forex reserves (or mismatches between earnings and high 
demand for debt service and essential imports, including investment 
goods and services). Also, like any other country, Ethiopia has many 
priorities, including importing medicines. What makes it pronounced 
for investors and financiers is the unpredictability of access to forex to 
expatriate profit. This study proposes a range of potential solutions 
to mitigate this risk, including commitment to a timeline for currency 
repatriation, allocation of a certain proportion of forex from energy 
exports, and developing the competitive domestic private sector to 
partner global IPPs and possibly reduce the demand to expatriate profit. 
Weak policy support to the nascent domestic private sector: We found no 
Ethiopian company participating in the renewable energy IPP tenders, but 
there is one junior partner with Enel Green Power on the Metehara solar 
PV project. In the medium and long term, a viable domestic private sector 
could mitigate (for example) the forex supply and currency convertibility 
issues described above. The development of the sector could not only 
reduce the need to convert birr into foreign currency to repatriate profits, 
it would also enhance knowledge and increase technology transfer, 
and boost local technology development and manufacturing. Thus we 
recommend a strong programme to nurture the domestic private sector 
through tax incentives, training and coaching, and promoting joint ventures.
Security risks: The armed conflicts in northern Ethiopia, as well as 
the lower-level ethnic-based political tensions across the country, 
conflated with global geo-politics and use of ‘soft’ power, have strained 
investment flows into the renewables and other sectors. Swift solution is 
key to tackling the worsening situation, as under current circumstances 
there can be very few political risk insurers willing to cover Ethiopian 
IPP projects. Project companies’ engagement with communities 
(promotion of community development works) can also provide the 
requisite ‘social license’ and be a source of strength during both peaceful 
and turbulent times, where communities protect foreign investment 
projects and infrastructure that lasts over two or more decades.
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Access to land/project sites: IPP projects were developed on assumptions 
about quick access to project sites, but for some projects the process of 
getting access on the ground was rather protracted. The socio-political 
environment required for securing land, consultation with local communities, 
and resolving compensation issues should therefore be part of the initial 
procurement plans.
To conclude, Ethiopia’s policy to transition to a mix of renewable energy 
resources and increase the contribution of non-hydro renewables with a 
segment procured by private suppliers has taken off from solid foundations. 
The legal and institutional framework to facilitate privately financed 
project development has resulted in a number of ongoing renewable 
energy IPP projects, with more in the pipeline. However, notable challenges 
remain in terms of governance, capacity gaps, and substantial risks to 
investment. Many of these problems are part of the learning process during 
the transition from a state-led to a market-led development pathway in 
the energy sector. A successful completion of at least one project would 
demonstrate the credibility of the process, and this is the most urgent task.
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